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Starting Down the Road to Reform:
Kentucky's New Long-Arm Statute for
Family Obligations
BY LouisE EvEEr GimH m*
INTRODUCTION
Kentucky has long needed a comprehensive family law provision for
its long-arm statute.' Before the general long-arn statute was amended
by the 1992 General Assembly, it addressed only a narrow class of
paternity cases among its specific jurisdictional provisions,2 ignoring the
need for long-arm jurisdiction in other domestic relations cases. A
second long-arm statute3 provided jurisdiction over some nonresidents to
establish or enforce child support obligations. In the contexts of divorce
and child support, Kentucky's failure to claim constitutionally available
jurisdiction deprived Kentucky residents of important protection.
A Kentucky court's power to grant a divorce depends on fulfllment
of a significant residency requirement by either the petitioner or the
respondent.4 Satisfaction of the residency requirement permits a Ken-
* Willburt Ham Professor of Law, Unversity of Kentucky College of Law. B.A. 1965, J.D.
1977, Urnversity of Texas.
'KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 454.210 (Michre/Bobbs-Merrill 1985 & Supp. 1992).
'See id. § 454.210(aX). The paternity long-arm section provides for personal jurisdiction over
a defendant who commits sexual intercourse in this state and thereby causes the birth of a child if
I) both of the child's parents are Kentucky dormcilianes, 2) there is a repeated pattern of intercourse
between the parents in Kentucky, or 3) the intercourse is a tort or crime in Kentucky. Id. Jurisdiction
based solely on the statute is limited to claims arising from the statutorily enumerated acts. Id. §
454.210(2)(b). The "arising from" limitation does not mean that child support cannot be established
in a paternity suit. Another statute provides that "the liabilities of the father may be enforced in the
same or other proceedings," referrmng to either establishment or acknowledgment proceedings. Id. §
406.021(3) (Miche/Bobbs-Merrill 1984 & Supp. 1992). The statutory reference to "other
proceedings" probably means that a failure of the court that establishes paternity to provide child
support does not bar a court from ordering support in a subsequent proceeding. Taken together, the
two statutes permit a Kentucky court to establish paternity and order support for children who were
conceived and born in Kentucky when the putative father cannot be served personally in the state.
'Id. § 454.275 (Mchie/Bobbs.Merrill 1985).
' Kentucky's divorce statute requires a petitioner to demonstrate that one of the parties
maintained a residence in Kentucky for 180 days immediately before the filing of the divorce
petition. Id. § 403.140(IXa) (Miclne/Bobbs-Merill 1984). Cf. UNiF. MA.RIAGE AND DVORCE Acr
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tucky court to dissolve the marriage, but it does not necessarily follow that
the Kentucky court has the power required to resolve all disputes related to
the "incidents of mamage."5 In order to render a binding adjudication on
issues such as property division and spousal support, the court must have
personal jurisdiction over both spouses In some cases, Kentucky could not
constitutionally assert jurisdiction over a nonresident respondent who lacked
connections to the state.7 In other instances, however, the absent respondent
§ 302(aX1), 9A U.L.A. 181 (1973) (90-day residency requirement). Residency requirements of one
year have been held consitutional. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975). If the defendant's presence
in the state satisfies the residency requirement, there is no jurisdictional issue. The petitioner spouse
consents to the court's jurisdiction, Becker v. Becker, 576 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. App. 1976), and the
defendant spouse's connection to Kentucky is presumed to be sufficiently alan to domicile to permit
the suit to be brought. See Louise GRAHAM & JAMEs E. KELLER, KENTUCKY DoMEsrc RELATIONS
LAW § T3.02(A) (1991) (discussing "residence" and "dormcile" as distinct legal terms); see also znfra
notes 39-55 and accompanying text. Kentucky courts have struggled with the appropriate meaning
of the residency requirement. Although the statutory language appears to address actual residence,
either actual residence or proof of domicile is required in the case of temporary absence from the
state. Kentucky courts have long permitted temporarily absent domicilianes to bring divorce actions
in the state without showing that they were actually present in Kentucky for the required statutory
period. See McGowan v. McGowan, 663 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) (parties absent from the
state while husband attended professional school); Broaddus v. Broaddus, 280 S.W.2d 144 (Ky. 1955)
(husband absent from Kentucky to attend college); Russell v. Hill, 256 S.W.2d 508 (Ky. 1953)
(husband absent on military duty).
See, e.g., In re Mamage of Booker, 833 P.2d 734, 737 (Colo. 1992) (absent personal
jurisdiction over defendant, court could not divide military pension as marital property); Smith v.
Smith, 459 N.W.2d 785, 788 (N.D. 1990) (finding that court could grant divorce but not alimony
without personal jurisdiction over defendant); In re Mamage of Anderson, 793 P.2d 1378, 1379 (Or.
Ct. App. 1990) (refusing to allow California court without personal jurisdiction over divorce
defendant to settle property and child support issues); see also mfra notes 56-82 and accompanying
text. Kentucky recognizes this lack of power in two ways. First, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
403.140(l)(d) (MichielBobbs-Merrill 1984) requires a court to consider child support, maintenance,
and property division to the extent that it has jurisdiction to do so. Second, the Kentucky statutes on
property division and maintenance contemplate proceedings that provide for property division or
maintenance after a divorce has been granted in another forum. The property division statute
authorizes action "in a proceeding for disposition of property following dissolution of the marriage
by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose
of the property." Id. § 403.190(1) (Micne/Bobbs-Merrill 1984 & Supp. 1992). The maintenance
statute applies to a "proceeding for maintenance following dissolution of a marriage by a court which
lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse." Id. § 403.200 (Micle/Bobbs Merrill 1984). At
the time the property division statute was drafted, jurisdictional doctrine treated the presence of a
party's property in the state as a sufficient nexus for determination of rights in that property.
Subsequent developments have changed that rule, rendenng obsolete the statutory language "orlacked
jurisdiction to dispose of the property" in Kentucky Revised Statutes § 403.190(1). See Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (limiting a state's personal jurisdiction over defendant that derives from
ownership of property within that statute to cause of action related to the property). But see Gaines
v. Gaines, 566 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (indicating, in dictum, that physical location of
property in Kentucky may give jurisdiction).
'See mfra notes 56-82 and accompanying text.
See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978) (holding that state of child's residence
lacks jurisdiction over defendant who has no other contacts with that state).
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had constitutionally sufficient connections with the state and yet could not be
served personally in Kentucky. In this latter case, Kentucky could not claim
long-ann jurisdiction over the respondent only because the state lacked an
adequate long-arm statute!
The absence of adequate long-arm provisions also impaired Kentucky's
ability to enforce child support obligations. Like many other states, Kentucky
has faced a growing number of children whose absent parents fail to provide
adequate support.9 Kentucky Revised Statutes section 454.275 provided long-
arm junsdiction over some absent respondents, but its reach was limited to
cases in which the obligor had been marred to the custodial parent, and it
also required proof that the obligor had left the state to avoid payment of the
obligation.'" When a case did not fit this scenario and did not fall within the
long-arm rles related to paternity," Kentucky courts were unable to
'See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 454.210(2)(b) (Mchice/Bobbs-Merrill 1985 & Supp. 1992)
(limiting statutory jurisdiction to enumerated acts).
' National statistics have long demonstrated that a large number of children living in poverty
suffer reduced econormc circumstances because of an absent parent's failure to provide support. S.
REP. No. 1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1974), repnnted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8133, 8145. Congress
adopted the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 602-06, 651-71, 1305, 1315, 1396a (1988)), to strengthen child
support enforcement The amendments required that states adopt various measures designed to
facilitate their collection of additional support. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 925, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
29, repnnted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2447. These included extended statutes of limitation for
paternity, id. at 37, new collection procedures, id. at 30-38, and the development of advisory child
support guidelines. Id. at 53-54; see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.212 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984
& Supp. 1992) (Kentucky child support guidelines). The Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-
485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 405, 503-04, 602-704, 1301-97 (1988)), amended the
Child Support Enforcement Amendments, requiring that the child support guidelines in each state
create a rebuttable presumption that the guidelines establish the appropriate amounts to be awarded.
S. REP. No. 377, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 17-19 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2776, 2779,
2794-96; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 998, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 91-92 (1988), repnnted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2879-80. Collection of child support obligations is particularly difficult when the case
involves a child support recipient in one state and an obligor in another state. Recent testimony
before Congress indicated that 14 million child support cases existed at the time of heanng. Interstate
child support cases represented 35% of that total, but only six percent of the child support collections
came from interstate cases. Criminal Penalty for Flight to Avoid Payment of Arrearages for Child
Support: Hearings on HR. 1241 Before the Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102 Cong., 2d. Sess. 28 (1992) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of
Harry W. Wiggans, Director, Virginia Department of Social Services Division of Child Support
Enforcement). See generally Harry B. O'Donnell IV, Title I of the Family Support Act of 1988-The
Quest for Effective National Child Support Enforcement Continues, 24 J. FAM. L. 149 (1990-91)
(suggesting further legislative improvements); Sue Nations, Louisiana's Child Support Guidelines:
A Preliminary Analysis, 50 L. L. REv. 1057 (1990) (evaluating the theoretical model of child
support guidelines and examining legislative provisions); Patricia G. Tjaden et al., Will These
Children Be Supported Adequately? The Impact of Current Guidelines, 28 JUDGE'S J. No. 4, Fall
1989, at 4 (discussing current child support guideline models).
See Tally v. Tally, 603 S.W.2d 486, 487 (Ky. 1980).
" See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.210(aX8) (Mccihe/Bobbs-Merrill 1985 & Supp. 1992); supra
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establish jurisdiction to secure adequate support for children residing in the
state.
12
Recent amendments to Kentucky statutes fill previous gaps and expand
Kentucky's jurisdiction m significant ways. This Article addresses Kentucky's
jurisdictional expansion m terms of its compliance with traditional mmunum
contacts analysis and m relation to the effect of developments in national
child support policy on future jurisdictional rules. Part I of this Article
explains the traditional rles of divorce jurisdiction and the basic concepts
underlying those traditions, as well as the constitutional controls on junsdic-
tion in family law cases. Part II analyzes and explains the provisions of the
new long-arm statute. 3 Finally, Part III considers the relationship between
jurisdiction, choice of law, and full faith and credit as they relate to state
interests in setting child support obligations within a federal system.
I. HISTORICAL JURISDICTIONAL CONCEPTS
A. Ex Parte Divorce, Divisible Divorce, and Child Support
1. Mamage Dissolution
Current students of family law may find it difficult to imagme the era in
which a party's right to seek a divorce was limited by a narrow range of
substantive grounds. From Kentucky's "no-fault" perspective, 4 divorce is
perhaps all too easily available. Fifty years ago, however, this was not the
case. In many states, a divorce could be granted only after long separation
and only for the most serious reasons.'" Moreover, even if one spouse could
note 2 and accompanying text.
" Kentucky residents seeking support from nonresident obligors have the option of using the
Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act [hereinafter "URESA"], KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 407.010- 480 (MichielBobbs-Merrill 1984). In recent testimony before Congress, however,
child support experts commented that a URESA petition was "the last thing' they wished to pursue
and that the remedy "takes forever." See Heanngs, supra note 9, at 35-36.
"Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 454.220 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992).
In Kentucky the sole ground for marriage dissolution is irretrievable breakdown. See KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 403.170 (MichietBobbs-Merrill 1984). Irretrievable breakdown means that there is "no
reasonable prospect of reconciliation." Id. § 403.170(3). Cf. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Act §
302(a)(2), 9A U.L.A. (1973) (using irretrievable breakdown).
" Although the United States as a whole experienced a slight decline in divorce rates between
1980 and 1990, Kentucky's divorce rate moved in the opposite direction. In 1980 there were
approximately 1,189,000 divorces in the United States. By 1990 the number had fallen to an
estimated 1,175,000. In Kentucky, however, the estimates had risen from 16,700 in 1980 to 21,800
in 1990. 1992 STATisricAL ABsrRAcr oF THE UN rrED STArEs 93.
" Kentucky courts of the period noted that marriage was for the life of the parties, and not to
be "thrown off for mere whims, or mere frailties or shortcormngs" not amounting to moral turpitude.
[Vol. 81
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prove that she was innocent and entitled to the divorce, divorces were
sometimes denied because of defenses such as condonation, a form of
estoppel that barred a spouse from asserting previously tolerated
behavior as a ground for divorce."
The historical importance of jurisdiction in matters of marriage
dissolution is related to differences among states in grounds for di-
vorce.'" If all states had enacted identically narrow divorce grounds,
the history of American divorce jurisdiction would probably be
different, and perhaps far less significant today Grounds for divorce
were not the same from one state to the next because divorce law was
the statutory creature of each state's legislature.'9 Moreover, divorce
Nall v. Nal, 153 S.W.2d 909, 914 (Ky. 1941). Other courts in the same era said that unhappmess
was not a ground for divorce. See Stevenson v. Stevenson, 30 A.2d 675, 676 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1943).
Nor, apparently, were "[s]tinginess, surliness, bad temper, irritability, or uncleanliness." Arnold v.
Arnold, 194 A. 229, 231 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1937). For a general lustory of American divorce law see
HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAw OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNrrED STATES § 12.1 (2d ed.
1988).
" Condonation was a defense based on the forgiveness of a prior marital fault on the condition
that it would not be repeated. See Hash v. Hash, 59 N.E.2d 735, 737 (Ind. Ct. App. 1945). In
Kentucky, condonation was not available as a defense if the ground for divorce was cruel treatment.
See Robb v. Robb, 137 S.W.2d 385, 386 (Ky. 1940).
See generally CLARK, supra note 16, § 12.1.
,See Wood v. Wood, 407 A.2d 282, 285 (Me. 1979). Grounds for divorce continue to vary
from state to state. See, eg., AlA. CODE § 30-2-1(aX1)-(12) (1989) (grounds range from irretrievable
breakdown to faults that include abandonment for one year, imprisonment for two years under
sentence of seven or more years, habitual drunkenness or drug addiction, insanity, non-support for
two years); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.050(l)-(9) (1991) (grounds include incompatibility of
temperament as well as faults such as personal indignities, adultery, and willful desertion for one
year); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-301(l)-(8) (Michie 1991) (grounds range from no fault to impotence,
cruel and barbarous treatment, and willful nonsupport); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4506 (West 1983)
(irremediable breakdown or incurable insanity); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-40-51 (West 1986)
(grounds include irretrievable breakdown as well as living apart for 18 months due to incompatibili-
ty); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.052 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992) (grounds include both irretrievable
breakdown and mental incompetence for up to three years); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-5-3(l).(13) (Micie
1991) (grounds include irretrievable breakdown and traditional fault grounds such as adultery,
desertion for one year, mental incapacity at the time of the marriage, cruel treatment, and incurable
mental illness); IDAHO CODE §§ 32-603; 32-610 (1983) (includes both irreconcilable differences and
five years' separation); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 401 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1991)
(irretrievable breakdown plus traditional grounds such as impotence and adultery); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-1-11.5-3 (Bums 1987) (grounds include irretrievable breakdown and traditional fault grounds
such as conviction of a felony, incurable insanity lasting for at least two years, and impotency
existing at the time of the mamage); KA. STAT. ANN. § 60-1601(a) (1983) (grounds include both
incompatibility and failure to perform a matenal duty or obligation); L.. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 103
(West Supp. 1992) (irretrievable breakdown as well as adultery); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §
691(1) (West 1991) (irreconcilable differences as well as fault grounds); MD. FAm. LAw CODE. ANN.
§ 7-103 (1991) (grounds include one-year voluntary separation or two years living separate and apart
as well as faults including insanity, adultery, or abandonment); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, §§
1, IA (West 1992) (grounds include both irretrievable breakdown and adultery, desertion for one
year, or cruel and abunve treatment); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 93-5-1, -2(1972 & Supp. 1990) (grounds
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include both irreconcilable differences and faults); Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.320 (1986) (irretnevable
breakdown for uncontested divorces, but if contested petitioner must show either period of separation
or fault); NEv. REv. STAT. § 125.010 (1991) (living separately for one year, incompatibility, and
insanity for two years); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 458:7, 7-a (1992) (grounds include irreconcilable
differences as well as extreme cruelty, absence for two years, or joining a religious sect or society
which believes that the relation of husband and wife is unlawful and refuing to cohabit for six
months); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2 (West 1987) (grounds include 18 months' separation in different
habitation and no reasonable prospect of reconciliation as well as traditional fault such as adultery,
willful desertion for 12 or more months, and extreme mental or physical cruelty); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-4-1 (Micle 1989) (incompatibility as well as traditional fault grounds such as abandonment or
adultery); N.Y. DoM. RE.L. LAw § 170 (McKinney 1988) (grounds include living apart for one year
pursuant to a separation agreement as well as cruel and inhuman physical or mental treatment and
other fault-related grounds); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-5.1, -6 (1987) (grounds include living separate
and apart for one year as well as three years' separation because of incurable insanity); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 14-05-03, -09.1 (1991) (grounds include irreconcilable differences and traditional grounds
such as willful neglect, habitual intemperance, and conviction of a felony); OHIO Rev. CODE ANN.
§ 3105.01 (Anderson 1989 & Supp. 1991) (grounds include living separately for one year as well as
faults such as bigamy, extreme cruelty, and any gross neglect of duty); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 101 (West 1990) (grounds include incompatibility and faults such as abandonment for one year,
habitual drunkenness, and gross neglect of duty); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301 (1991) (grounds
include irretrievable breakdown and also fault, such as indignities); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 15-5-2, -3
(1988) (grounds include irreconcilable differences as well as extreme cruelty, adultery, or any other
gross misbehavior and wickedness that is "repugnant to and in violation ofthe mamage covenant");
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1989) (living apart for one year as well as traditional fault
grounds such as physical cruelty and habitual drunkenness); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-4-1
to -18 (1992) (irreconcilable differences and also adultery, extreme cruelty and other fault grounds);
TEiNN. CODE ANN. §§ 364-101, -102 (1991) (irreconcilable differences as well as impotence, bigamy,
adultery, and other fault grounds); Tex. FAm. CODE ANN. §§ 3.01-.07 (West Supp. 1991) ("mamage
has become insupportable because of discord or conflict ofpersonalities that destroys legitimate ends
of mamage relationship and prevents any reasonable expectation of reconciliation," as well as living
apart for three years and traditional grounds such as cruelty); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-1(3) (1989)
(grounds include irreconcilable differences and living apart for three consecutive years under a decree
of separate maintenance without cohabitation as well as fault grounds such as physical or mental
cruelty); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551 (1989) (grounds include finding that "resumption of marital
relationship is not reasonably probable" as well as traditional grounds such as willful desertion or
absence); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (Micle 1990 & Supp. 1992) (grounds include living apart as well
as adultery, causing apprehension of bodily hurt, and other fault); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-4 (1992)
(grounds include irreconcilable differences as well as traditional fault such as adultery, felony
conviction, and habitual drunkenness).
Several junsdictions, including Kentucky, see supra note 14 and accompanying text, consider
only so-called no-fault grounds. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-312 (1991) (irretrievable
breakdown); COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-110 (1987) (same); DEL. CoDE. ANN. tit. 13 § 1505 (1981)
(defining irretrievable breakdown to include some acts of msconduct); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-904
(1989) (requiring proof of period of separation without reference to fault); HAw. REv. STAT. § 580-
41 (1985) (defining "no fault" as either irretrievable breakdown or living apart for specified period);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.5(7) (West 1981 & Supp. 1991) (irretrievable breakdown); MICH. CoMi.
LAWS ANN. § 552.6 (West 1988) (breakdown of relationship); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.06 (West
1990) (irretrievable breakdown); MONT. CODE ANN. § 404-104(b) (1991) (irretrievable breakdown
with evidence of separation or serious discord); NE. REv. STAT. § 42-361 (1988) (irretrievable
breakdown); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 107.025, .036 (irreconcilable differences; doctrine of fault
abolished); WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.030 (1992) (irretrievable breakdown); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
767.12(2) (West 1981 & Supp. 1992) (same); WYO. STAT. §§ 20-2-104, -105 (1987) (irreconcilable
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courts did not exercise a choice of law function m determining whether
a particular petitioner was entitled to a divorce' If the petitioner
qualified for a divorce under forum law, that law supplied the rule of
decision.
Just as some states had more liberal grounds for divorce, some had
less stringent residency requirements' Unhappily mamed persons
quickly learned that m some cases a divorce that could not be obtained
at home could be granted in another state. For example, a mamed North
Carolina storekeeper who had fallen in love with the wife of his clerk
differences as well as traditional grounds such as insanity).
, See RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLiCrS OF LAws § 285 (1971).
21 Like grounds for divorce, residency requrements continue to vary. See, eg., ALA- CODE §
30-2-5 (1989) (six-month residence for petitioner where respondent is a nonresident); Aiu.. Rav.
STAT. ANN. § 25-312 (1991) (state must be either party's domicile or place of military assignment
for 90 days before filing); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-307(aXi) (Miche 1991) (either party must
actually be present in state for 60 days before commencement of action and three months before
final decree); CAL. Civ. CODE. § 4530(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1993) (either party must have resided
in state for six months); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-106 (West 1987) (90 day residence
required); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-44(cXl) (West 1986) (one year); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 1504 (1981) (six months); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-902 (1989) (six months); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
61.021 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992) (six months); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-5-2 (Michie 1991) (six
months); HAw. REV. SAT. § 580-1 (1985) (six months); IDAHO CODE § 32-701 (1983) (Six weeks);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 401(1) (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1991) (90 days); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-1-11.5-6(a) (Bums 1987) (six months); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.6 (West 1981) (one year);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1603 (1983) (sixty days); LA. CODE CIV. PRoc. AN. art. 10 (West 1960
& Supp. 1992) (six months); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 691(2) (West 1991) (six months); MD.
FAM. LAw CODE. ANN. § 7-101 (1991) (bona fide residency, defined as one year if the cause of
action arose outside of state); MAss. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 208, §§ 4, 5 (West 1992) (accord); MICH.
COMp. LAws. ANN. § 552.9 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (180 days unless the cause occurred outside
of state, then one year); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.07 (West 1990) (180 days); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 93-5-5 (1972 & Supp. 1990) (six months); Mo. Rav. STAT. § 452.305(1) (1986) (90 days); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-4-104(lXa) (1991) (same); NEB. REv. SAT. § 42-349 (1988) (one year); Nuv.
R v. STAT. § 125.020 (1991) (six weeks); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 458.5, .6 (1992) (one year and
cause of action must arise while plaintiff domiciled in state); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-10 (West
1987) (one year); N.M. SAT. ANN. § 40-4-5 (Miche 1989) (six months); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw
§ 230 (McKinney 1986) (one year unless cause occurs in state and both parties reside in state when
suit is filed); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-8 (1987) (six months); N.D. CENr. CODE § 14-05-17 (1991)
(six months); Oio Rav. CODE ANN. §§ 3105.03, .62 (Anderson 1989 & Supp. 1991) (six months);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 102 (West 1990) (six months); ORE. Rav. STAT. § 107.075 (1991) (six
months); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3104 (1991) (six months); R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-5-12 (1988)
(one year); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-30 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (one year, but three months if both
parties reside in state); S.D. CODwieD LAws ANN. § 25-4-30 (1992) (must be resident at time of
filing); TENN. CODE ANN. § 364-104 (1992) (six months); TEx FAm. CODE ANN. § 3.21 (West
Supp. 1991) (six months); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-1(2) (1989) (three months); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 592 (1989) (six months); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-97 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1992) (six
months); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-7 (1992) (one year unless for adultery); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
767.05(lm) (West 1981 & Supp. 1992) (six months); Wyo. STAT. § 20-2-107 (1987) (60 days).
Washington has no residency requrement, although no divorce decree can be issued until 90 days
after service upon respondent. See WAsH. Ray. CODE § 26.09.030 (1992).
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found that the divorce unavailable to him m North Carolina could be
obtained m Nevada after a short stay in that state.'
The initial problems surrounding divorce jurisdiction grew out of
movement between states and the clash of conflicting state rles.s One
issue in determining the limits of state court jurisdiction was the power
of the forum state over the absent nondomiciliary spouse. A second,
corollary issue was the effect of the divorce forum's judgment in a sister
state.24 A state might grant a petitioner a divorce on the grounds of
incompatibility, assuming that as his domicile the forum had sufficient
interest in his marital status to control the dissolution of the marriage, but
the state m which his former spouse remained domiciled had competing
interests in their marital status.ss In Williams v. North Carolina ("Wil-
liams I"),26 the United States Supreme Court recogmzed that the Due
Process Clause might limit state court assertions ofjurisdiction in divorce
actions, just as it did in other areas.27 The Court held, however, that due
process had been satisfied by the petitioner's (presumptively bona fide)'
domiciliary connections to the forum and, as a corollary, that a forum's
divorce judgment dissolving the marriage of a forum domiciliary was
entitled to full faith and credit m a sister state court.29
' Tins example is taken from the facts in Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942)
[hereinafter Williams 1]. Mr. Williams and Mrs. Hendrix, who had been marred to a clerk in
Williams' store, left North Carolina and traveled to Nevada where they were granted divorces. They
then wramed and returned to live in the same area of North Carolina as their former spouses. North
Carolina prosecuted the Williams for bigamous cohabitation. They raised their Nevada divorces in
defense to that prosecution. For a detailed discussion of the Williams I facts, see Thomas R. Powell,
And Repent At Leisure: An Inquiry into the Unhappy Lot of Those Whom Nevada Hath Joined
Together and North Carolina Hath Put Asunder, 58 HARv. L. Ray. 930 (1945).
' For a general discussion of nugratory divorce see David P. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the
Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and Borax, 34 U. CHI. LAw REy. 26 (1966) (suggesting
adoption of federal divorce law).
See generally Powell, supra note 22; Currie, supra note 23.
"In this Article, statements that a state has an "interest" in the marital status of its dormcilianes
express the notion that a state has public policy directed toward the maintenance and formation of
familial relationships. In contrast, the status label attached to divorce-related litigation reflects the
histoncal concept of a marital "res" that might be located in the domicile of either spouse and the
consequent in rem nature of jurisdiction to grant marriage dissolution. See RoBERT A. LELAR,
AMpmCAN CONFLicrs LAw § 221 (3d. ed 1977). After the United States Supreme Court decision
in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), distinctions based on labels such as in rem, quain-m-rem,
or personal jurisdiction seem less appropriate than an analysis based on state interests. Indeed, tis
focus on state interests is a return to the Supreme Court's language in earlier cases dealing with ex
parte divorce (i.e., when only one party appears before the court). See Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 297-99
(discussing state's interest in the marital status of its domcilianes).
"317 U.S. 287 (1942).
Id. at 296-97, 299, 301; see Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) (holding money judgment
invalid because court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant).
"See Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 291, 297, 302.
Id. at 297, 301. A divorce suit "is not a mere in personarn action," id. at 297, nor is it strictly
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The Williams I decision spoke to both due process and full faith and
credit requirements. The Court held that the Due Process Clause did not
invalidate Nevada's attempt to grant the Williamses a valid divorce. A
forum state that was the domicile of the petitioner spouse could constitu-
tionally grant that spouse a divorce from a nonresident respondent30 if
the nonresident had received notice adequate to provide procedural
protection.' This holding modified the traditional due process require-
ment for personal causes of action. Jurisdiction to dissolve marriages is
set apart from all other types of litigation because it emphasizes the
petitioner's forum connections rather than those of the respondent. 2
The Williams I opinion supported the divorce forum's interest in
granting a divorce to an individual whose claim to be a forum domiciliary
had not been disputed in the divorce proceeding.3 The Court noted that
any forum had a strong interest in the marital status of its domici-
lianes. 4 Marital status and the consequent legitimacy or illegitimacy of
children could affect not only the morality of the forum's populace but,
perhaps more importantly, title to property located within the forum.35
an in rem action.
' While only domicile has been recognized as a constitutionally sufficient basis for the grant
of an cx paste divorce, commentators generally agree that other adequate reasons include military
presence and satisfaction of a substantial residency requirement. See generally RUSSELL J.
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICr OF LAWS § 5.2G (3d ed. 1986); LEFLAR, supra note
25, § 223. Kentucky's residency statute includes military presence as a bans for jurisdiction. KY.
REy. STAT. ANN. § 403.140(lXa) (Miclne/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
"I Cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (holding that
method of notice must be reasonably designed to give interested parties notice and opportunity to
respond). For a general discussion of Kentucky's notice requirements see GRAHAM & KELLER, supra
note 4, § "3.04.
, Ex parte divorce thus requires no purposeful availing on the part of the respondent spouse,
although other clams of personal jurisdiction demand that activity. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84 (1978) (discussed mfra notes 98-102 and accompanying text); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 250-53 (1958) (requing that defendant have "purposefully availed" lumself of the privileges
and benefits of the forum state before personal jurisdiction found).
" Williams I, 317 U.S. at 291, 302. Since the nonresident spouse is not before the court in an
ex parte divorce, there is no litigant interested in challenging the court's jurisdiction. In Kentucky,
jurisdiction may be established by the testimony of the petitioner spouse, unless challenged by the
respondent. See KY. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 403.025 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984 & Supp. 1992).
'" See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
" Williams I, 317 U.S. at 298. Williams I manifested a strong territonal orientation, exhibiting
deference to the forum state not only because of the state's need to control morality by controlling
behavior within the forum, but also because the chosen rule's impact on forum land title required
respect for the forum state's right to grant a divorce. Nevada's interest in granting a divorce to the
petitioner claiming to be a donciliary was closely tied to its interest in the possible implications for
Nevada land title. Concern with land title was viewed largely as a local matter, of significant interest
only to the state in which the land was located. See Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909) (refusing to give
full faith and credit to decree by court with jurisdiction over both parties that sought to convey out-
of-state property); cf. Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900) (holding decision of court of testator s
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If a man whose move to Nevada represented a change of domicile could not
be granted a divorce by that forum, he could not establish legitimate family
relationships within the Nevada forum itself 6 Thus, Nevada's need to
protect the moral welfare of its domiciliaries, as well as its interest m title to
land located within the state, dictated that North Carolina be required to give
full faith and credit to divorces granted to Nevada domiciliaries.
An analysis based on the forum state's interest in the petitioners status
raised problems of respect for the laws of sister states because any advance-
ment of the forum state's policy also served to deter that of the respondent's
state.37 As the Court observed in a later case, also styled Williams v. North
Carolina ("Williams if"), marriage dissolution often meant severing the
relationship of two persons whose domiciles were located in different states.
If the divorce forum was interested m the petitioner as its purported
domiciliary, the state in which the absent respondent continued to live had an
equally strong interest in protection of the spouse who remained behmdY'
Although Williams I necessarily found that a second forum's interest in the
stay-at-home spouse was not sufficient in itself to deny effect to the prior
Nevada divorce decree, Nevada's power was based on the court's factual
determination that the litigant was indeed a forum domiciliary. Having
anchored Nevada's power to grant a valid divorce on the petitioner's
domiciliary connection to that state, the Court had also provided a way to
limit that power.
A determination of domicile is factual3 Although domicile implies a
permanent sort of connection between the petitioner seeking a divorce and the
forum chosen for the litigation, ex parte divorce petitioners had a not
particularly surprising habit of vacating Nevada or similar forums shortly after
doniciliary state does not bind court of state in winch real property is located). In a similar manner,
the listoncal fiction that the marriage was a res located in the domcile of either spouse had territorial
roots, but also expressed the significant interest of the domicile in that marital status.
3 Williams I, 317 U.S. at 298-301.
" In more recent cases, the Supreme Court has recognized two aspects of federalism: respect for
the interests of a coordinate sovereign and respect for the finality of judgments. See Thomas v.
Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 285 (1980). In the context of ex parte divorce, the
problems are related to the first of these federalism concerns. While Thomas involved full faith and
credit for worker's compensation claims, the federalism issues there are not unrelated to those arising
in marriage dissolution. One Supreme Court Justice has compared a state's interest in its worker's
compensation laws to its interest in its divorce laws. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S.
430, 446 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring), overruled on other grounds, Thomas v. Washington Gas
Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
" Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 230 (1945) [hereinafter Williams II]; see also
Esenwein v. Pennsylvania, 325 U.S. 279 (1945) (holding Nevada decree created presumption of bona
fide Nevada domicile; presumption could be overcome by respondent's presenting competent evidence
in Pennsylvania court).
' Williams 1, 325 U.S. at 232; see also mnfra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
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the divorce to return to the state that would not grant them the divorce in the
first instance.4 On appeal from North Carolina's second prosecution of the
Williamses, the Uited States Supreme Court ruled that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause4" did not require the state in which the respondent spouse was
domiciled at the time the divorce was granted to accept the divorce forum's
finding that the petitioner was a forum domiciliary.42 Williams II gave play
to the interests of North Carolina, allowing the court of the divorce respon-
dent's domicile to invalidate the petitioner's divorce decree if it found that the
petitioner had not in fact been domiciled in the divorce forum when the
mamage dissolution was granted.43
Domicile lay at the heart of this jurisdictional scheme because in theory
it represented a permanent connection to a territorial base.' In an era pre-
dating the FAX, the car phone, and frequent flier miles, the individual's
relationship to the domicile may have been more enduring. In a modern,
mobile society the notion of permanent connections might seem unrealistic.
"See, eg., Fink v. Fink, 346 N.E.2d 415 (Ill. App. 1976) (denying full faith and credit to
divorce decree obtained by Illinois resident who returned immediately after Nevada divorce); Cooper
v. Cooper, 217 N.W.2d 584 (Iowa 1974) (doctor divorced in Nevada returned to Iowa after
remriage; presumption ofjunsdiction sustained); Linck v. Linck, 288 N.E.2d 347 (01o C.P. 1972)
(Ohio railroad employee returned to Ohio after Nevada divorce and remarriage but evidence of
domiciliary intent sufficient to sustain divorce decree).
"U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 1.
l The Williams 11 Court demanded due respect for sister state decrees but permitted a second
forum to redetermine the jurisdictional fact of domicile. The Court noted with approval the North
Carolina trial court's charge to the jury that the Nevada decree's recitation of petitioner's domicile in
Nevada was prima facie evidence of that domicile in the North Carolina forum. Williams II, 326 U.S.
at 235-36. Thus, it permitted the North Carolina fact-finder to deterrmne that the Williamses had been
Nevada dormicilianes, but it did not mandate that they do so. The Williams II jury had been
instructed that the defendants had the burden of proof on the issue of their Nevada domicile. The
Court found that this accorded sufficient respect to the Nevada decree. See also Taylor v. Taylor, 242
S.W.2d 747, 749 (Ky. 1951) (applying the pnma facie evidence rule).
"IThe Williams II Court suggested that the standard for deternmmng domicile in such cases was
a federal one, based on the national interest in the relationship between states. Williams I, 325 U.S.
at 231 (1945). See generally WEnTRAUB, supra note 30, § 5.2C at 243-44. While a federal standard
may be applied in the event of Supreme Court review, a forum normally applies its own domicile
rules to determine whether an individual is a forum dormciliary in the first instance. See Gray v.
Roth, 438 N.W.2d 25, 28-29 (Iowa Ct. App.) (applying Iowa law of dormcile to determine that
decedent was not an Arkansas domiciliary at the time of his wife's ex parte divorce), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 825 (1989).
" In Kentucky, the notion of permanent domicile is best illustrated by cases holding that a
Kentucky domicile is not lost by a temporary absence. Kentucky courts have treated long absent
native-burn Kentucians as domicilianes, bringing them within the shelter of the temporary absence
rile even when the circumstances suggest more than a temporary absence. See Weintraub v. Murphy,
244 S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1951) (more than 20 years' absence); see also Russell v. Hill, 256 S.W.2d 508
(Ky. 1953). Occasionally, Kentucky courts have confused the issue of actual residence with domicile.
See Lanham v. Lanharn, 188 S.W.2d 439, 440 (1945) (denying petitioner husband right to Kentucky
divorce because he lacked actual residence in Kentucky). The Lanham husband was neither an actual
resident (having maintained a home and family in Ohio for several years) nor a domiciliary.
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Nevertheless, domicile continues to express an rnportant legal connection
between an individual and a state, one that cames some connotations of
uniqueness, if not permanence.45 Although every person always has a
domicile, he or she has only one domicile at a time. Domicile has been
described as an individual's "fixed habitation"47 or "the home." 4 Courts
have said that one's domicile is the "true, fixed, permanent home," the "place
[to which] he always intends to return when he is away.' 49 While competent
adults may elect a domicile," a change of domicile requires a present and
fixed intention to make the change, as well as physical presence m the place
to which the domicile has been moved." An individual could not be
domiciled in a forum state if he had gone to that state for the sole purpose of
being granted a divorce without any intent to make it his domicile. 52 Thus,
for the Williams I Court domicile may have seemed a way to determine the
state with the strongest policy concerns related to the issue of an individual's
marital status. Moreover, domicile has the observable, objective characteristic
of physical presence within a state. If a petitioner immigrated to a state and
became a permanent resident, that state clearly had a strong interest m his or
her marital status. Marriage dissolution rules initially emphasized the new
state's strong interest, ignoring the interest of the state in which the spouse
was left behind.
Although domicile had this objective aspect, it also possessed characteris-
tics that made its determination less than certain. Domicile depends not only
on physical presence but also on intent!3 If the divorce petitioner intended
" The degree of permanence required has changed over time. See Rzeszotarski v. Rzesotarsha,
296 A.2d 431, 435 (D.C. 1972) (citing Jones v. Jones, 136 A.2d 580, 582 (D.C. 1957), which
contrasts the English requirement of "fixed intent to remain here permanently' with the American
test of .'absence of any intention to go elsewhere'). Compare White v. Termant, 8 S.E. 596, 597 (W.
Va. 1888) (applying histoncal rule that domiciliary must intend to remain for an indefinite period of
time) with RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 18 (1971) (donuciliary must intend to
make state his domicile "for the time at least").
" REsrATEmENr (SEcoND) OF CoNFLicrs OF LAWS § 11 (1971).
"In re Marriage of Kimura, 471 N.W.2d 869, 877 (Iowa 1991).
"See Scoggins v. Scoggins, 555 A.2d 1314, 1322 n.15 (Pa. Super. 1989) (quoting a 1925
address by Justice Cardozo to the American Law Institute).
Person v. Person, 563 N.E.2d 161, 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
"See generally WEINTRAUB, supra note 30, § 2.2-.9.
"See REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 15(2), 18 (1971).
Normally, states do not examnne motive. See WENRAUB, supra note 30, at § 17. However,
some states apply a rule requiring that the divorce petitioner acquire a bona fide or good faith
domicile in the state. See In re Marriage of Kimura, 471 N.W.2d 869, 877 (Iowa 1991); cf. Linck
v. Linck, 288 N.E.2d 347, 349 (Ono C.P. 1972) (mere fact that a party left forum state and went to
another state for the express purpose of procuring a divorce does not require that forum refuse
recognition of foreign divorce decree, provided that the party "intended to make the foregn state his
residence or domicile").
" McGowan v. McGowan, 663 S.W.2d 219, 222-23 (Ky. App. 1983); see also Person v. Person,
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to remain for an indefinite period of time, he was a divorce forum
domiciliary, but if he had no real intention to remain and only wanted a
divorce, he was not.' Once a party who had claimed to be a Nevada
domiciliary returned to the state in which his former spouse remained
domiciled, he raised questions about his intent at the time of the divorce.
If he was not a Nevada domiciliary when he was granted the divorce,
then he never changed his domicile from North Carolina.5 A system
theoretically grounded on the domiciliary attachment to a state could not
then deny that a state m the position of North Carolina had a significant
interest in the parties' marital status.
2. The Incidents of Mamage
A second area of conflicting state interests arose out of those cases
concerning not merely dissolution of the marital status, but the rights
arising from the marriage. As with adjudication of marital status, the
problem was raised by migratory divorce. In Estin v. Estin,56 the Umted
States Supreme Court distinguished the incidents of marriage from the
marital status itself, creating a jurisdictional rule that looked not to a
state's interest in its domiciliary petitioner, but to the respondent spouse's
connection to the forum state. The Court held that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause did not require New York to enforce a Nevada divorce
decree that made no provision for post-dissolution support of a New York
wife who had rights to separate maintenance under a prior New York
decree.' The Estin Court created the concept of divisible divorce, which
treated property rights arising from marriage differently from the marital
status itself. While marital status might be dissolved based on a petition-
er's connection with the forum, property rights could not be adjudicated
unless the forum court had personal jurisdiction over the respondent
spouse." In Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt,59 the Court extended the divisible
563 N.E.2d 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (wife who returned to Illinois to effect reconciliation lost
Indiana domicile because she intended to move back to Indiana only if reconciliation unsuccessful);
Kimura, 471 N.W.2d at 877-78 (Japanese physician husband's acqusition of green card and tenure
track position at an Iowa university showed bona fide intent to claim domicile).
See, eg., Linck v. Lmck, 288 N.E.2d 347, 349 (Ohio C.P. 1972) (stating the general nile).
"See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
334 U.S. 541 (1948).
" Id. at 549.
SiId.
354 U.S. 416 (1957). Kentucky courts have applied the Estin-Vanderbilt rules on the few
occasions raising the issue. See, eg., Murphy v. Murphy, 464 S.W.2d 231 (Ky. 1970); Pollard v.
Pollard, 330 S.W.2d 407 (Ky. 1959); Davis v. Davis, 303 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. 1957).
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divorce rule to instances m wich the respondent spouse's support rights
had not been set by a prior decree."
The Williams-Vanderbilt cases outlined a system of controls on
divorce jurisdiction derived from the Due Process6 and Full Faith and
Credit62 Clauses. Marriage dissolution depended on the petitioner's
domicile; the respondent's forum connections were irrelevant." Adjudi-
cation of property rights, such as establishment of the right to alimony,'
followed more traditional rules of personal jurisdiction and focused on the
respondent's connections to the forum.65 Although rules related to status
adjudication and those on the incidents of marriage are both articulated
in terms of judicial jurisdiction," they represent two different problems.
One of those problems is related to modem due process concerns, the
other to issues associated with full faith and credit. Due process
limitations on judicial and legislative jurisdiction typically protect a
defendant from the unfair surprise of litigating her case in a forum with
wich she has insufficient connections.67 In contrast, full faith and credit
Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. at 418-19.
"U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
'U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 1.
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
"At the time the Williams cases were decided, the concept of marital property that is now
widespread had not been proposed or adopted by any state. Kentucky adopted the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act in 1972, including its property division provisions. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
403.010, .110-.350 (MichietBobbs-Merrill 1984 & Supp. 1992); UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVoRcE Act,
9A U.L.A. 147 (1973). Before the adoption of that Act, the right to alimony was the only significant
economic right ansing from the marriage. See also CLARK, supra note 16, § 15.1 (noting that
alimony is less important because of change in women's social status).
" Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948). An exception to the
requrement that the forum have personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse to affect property-related
issues arose in Simons v. Miam Beach First Nat'l Bank, 381 U.S. 81 (1965). The Supreme Court
held that Florida's ex parte divorce might cut off inchoate dower rights in Florida real property: "The
inchoate right of dower is a creature of the law, born of the mamage altar and finds it
sepulchre in divorce." Id. at 85-86 n.6. As in Williams I, the Simons outcome is related to a state's
interest in protection of title to real property located within the state. Unlike Williams I, however, the
Simons case probably involves a false conflict. See mfra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
" Thus, a forum is said to have jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage if the petitioner spouse is a
forum state dormciliary, Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 291 (1942), but to lack
jurisdiction over the respondent spouse for purposes of a support determination. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S.
at 418-19; Estin, 34 U.S. at 549; see also Smith v. Smith, 459 N.W.2d 785 (N.D. 1990). Other
commentators have noted the necessary relationship between the reach of a state's jurisdiction to
adjudicate and its ability to apply its own law as the rule of decision. See WEINrAUB, supra note
30, § 4.2.
"Although some early Supreme Court cases proceeded on a full faith and credit analysis,
Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932), modem constitutional controls on choice
of law have been found primarily in the Due Process Clause. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). For an argument that full faith and
credit should play a stronger role in choice of law see Peter Hay, Full Faith and Credit and
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limitations implicate problems of appropriate respect between sister states.S
The status cases, those in which the validity of an ex parte divorce is
determined, are generally said to be exceptions to the minmum contacts
requirement of personal junsdiction 9 However, the status exception might
also be seen as a rule grounded m choice of law principles.
The absence of a choice of law function m most divorce cases may
obscure the relationship of the Williams cases to general conflict of laws
rules. In most types of litigation, a forum must examine choice of law issues
separately from the question of personal jurisdiction. The general rule in
divorce, that a forum applies its own law, reduces these two mqures to a
single question. Although ex parte divorce cases do not confront the choice
of law directly, it is implicit in the decisions.
Viewed in relationship to choice of law, the two Williams cases illustrate
either a true conflict or a false conflict, depending on whether the petitioner
spouse is actually domiciled in the first forum.70 The Williams I rule
proceeds from the notion that the forum state has a significant interest in the
status of the domiciliary petitioner because it is the place m which the
domiciliary is most likely to remarry and form another family.' If the
petitioner is indeed a divorce forum domiciliary, the forum state's interest in
his status will lead to the application of forum law to determine his right to
divorce, notwithstanding the other state's interest, because most forums faced
with a true conflict will apply forum law.73 If the divorce petitioner is not
a bona fide domiciliary, however, the state in which the absent respondent
resided and in which the petitioner was probably domiciled at the time of
divorce74 has the most significant interest in marital status. Moreover, the
Federalism in Choice of Law, 34 MERCER L. REv. 709 (1983).
,See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 285 (1980); see also supra note 37
and accompanying text.
"See e.g., In re Marriage of Kimura, 471 N.W.2d 869, 875 (Iowa 1991). For a case
acknowledging that the basis of the status exception is a fictional, intangible res that terminated with
the marriage, see Carr v. Carr, 385 N.E.2d i234, 1235-36 (N.Y. 1978).
" The concept of false conflicts, in which only one state has a policy at stake, and true conflicts,
in which both states whose laws may be applied to resolve the dispute have interests at stake, was
first developed by Brainerd Curne. See generally BIt.INEiD CuR~i, SELECrED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICr OF LAWS (1963); see also WINrtAUB, supra note 30, §§ 3.6, 6.1.
See supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
nWilliams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298-301 (1942). Modem choice of law doctrine
recognizes the difference between conduct-regulating rules and rules of loss allocation. A forum state
may have an interest in the application of its conduct-regulating rules when it would not have an
interest in the application of rules of loss allocation. See Shultz v. Boy Scouts Of America, Inc., 480
N.E.2d 679, 684-85 (N.Y. 1985).
' See, eg., Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968) (applying Kentucky's rule on
interspousal immunity although Ohio, where spouses were donuciled, had a possible interest).
If the party who claimed to be a domiciliary in the first forum made a false claim and did not
intend to change his or her domicile, he or she would have retained the domicile of origin. See In
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case may be a false conflict: a forum m the position of Nevada m the
Williams cases has no interest in the marital status of a nondomiciliary
who does not reside m the state. Thus, the status exception to the
requirement that a defendant have minimum contacts with a forum is not
related to surprise and fairness concerns,75 but to the interests of states
in regulating matters within either their territorial limits or their general
jurisdiction.
Consideration of the status exception in relation to the choice of law
rule rather than solely as a rule of personal jurisdiction better explains
why fairness to the absent defendant can be achieved even when he or
she has no contact with the forum. Moreover, linking status and choice
of law would explain the Williams II loophole, which allows the second
forum to reexamine the jurisdictional issue of domicile,76 as the outcome
of a true conflict that the Full Faith and Credit Clause is unable to
regulate.
77
Divisible divorce has a strong relationship to choice of law in
addition to its recognized jurisdictional characteristics. Both the forum
that granted the divorce and the domicile of the respondent have interests
at stake. While the divorce forum has the strongest interest in the marital
re Person v. Person, 563. N.E.2d 161, 164 (Ind. App. 1991) ("A self-serving statement of intent is
not sufficient to establish that a new domicile has been acquired.'); Linck v. Linck, 288 N.E.2d 347,
349 (Ohio. C.P. 1972) (finding return and remramage contradicted claim of Nevada domicile).
' See In re Marriage of Kramer, 589 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Il. App. Ct. 1992) (citing Boyer v.
Boyer, 383 N.E.2d 223, 225 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) for the proposition that restrictions on state
jurisdiction are '"more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenience"' and acknowledging that
'they are a consequence of territorial limitation on the power of respective states."). The absence
of surprise and fairness concerns does not mean that a respondent spouse domiciled in North Carolina
has no complaints about the use of a Nevada forum and Nevada's more lenient divorce law to
dissolve her mamage. It may mean, however, that Nevada's interest in dormcilianes other than the
petitioner permits it to give greater weight to the need for a valid mamage dissolution. As a practical
matter, the North Carolina spouse probably surmises the end of the relationship, although she does
not know which forum with more lenient divorce laws her spouse may choose.
See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
"If both states have a legitimate interest, the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not provide a
mechanism for subordinating the interest of one state to that of the other. In the area of worker's
compensation, this has resulted in a rule allowing the application of either the law of the state of
injury or the state of employment Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306
U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935). Only
in those instances in which a forum state has no viable interest in the litigation has either the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 161-62 (1932) (finding
Vermont's worker's compensation law a valid defense to wrongful death action brought in sister state
that lacked meamngful relation to cause of action), or the Due Process Clause, Home Ins. Co. v.
Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407 (1930) (holding Texas court violated due process by depriving party of
property in absence of nummum contacts with Texas), barred the forum state's application of its laws.
Though both cases involved constitutional controls on choice of law in areas other than divorce, the
principles that they represent apply to ex parte divorce where the lack of a choice of law function
means that jurisdictional rules also serve as the choice of law rules.
FAMILY OBLIGATIONS
status of its domiciliary, it has no legitimate interest in allowing that obligor
entirely to escape support duties arising from a prior marriage. The divisible
divorce cases are thus like false conflicts." They emphasize faimess to the
defendant over state interest in marital status because no state has a legitimate
interest in entirely depriving a former spouse of support when doing so will
produce an unwarranted windfall to a local obligor. Of course, the very fact
that Estin79 and Vanderbilt" had to be decided in the Supreme Court
indicates that states do not necessarily see the false conflict.8 ' Therefore, the
cases may express the national interest in proper respect for sister state
concerns that emanates from the Full Faith and Credit ClauseY
3. Emergence of Long-Arm Statutes as a
Solution to Divisible Divorce
In theory, divisible divorce prevented a party who was granted a Nevada
divorce from cutting off the support rights of a spouse who remained behind
in North Carolina. If, however, the Nevada divorce petitioner remained in that
state and did not return to North Carolina, the promise of divisible divorce
was rather empty. The Nevada petitioner was unlikely to seek to set more
than the most mininal support in the Nevada divorce, if support received any
mention at all. The North Carolina spouse now had no jurisdictional avenue
through which to pursue her former spouse in Nevada for support. The
Nevada spouse's change of domicile had deprived the North Carolina spouse
of the right to use North Carolina's general jurisdiction over its domiciliaries
as the jurisdictional basis for her support claim. 3
' Divisible divorce minght also be explained on a more modem conflicts basis, such as
comparative impairment. See Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719, 721-24 (Cal.) (finding that
Califomria's interest in recovery for injured motonst would have been inappropnately impaired by
application of Nevada's protective dram shop act to defendant who actively solicited California
business), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976). Certainly the obligor seeing an ex parte divorce has
no reason to be suiprised that the state in which he has left a spouse or children to whom he owes
a support duty continues to expect him to fulfill that duty.
"Estin v. Estin, 34 U.S. 541 (1948).
"Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1967).
"See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
"See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932). See generally WENrRAuB,
supra note 30, at 550. Explaimng the divisible divorce cases as false conflicts does not address an
important issue relevant to current problems in child support enforcement. Even if a state has no
legitimate interest in serving as a safe haven for obligors avoiding support duties, it may have an
interest in protecting the support rights of the obligor's subsequent family living within the state. In
the future, that problem may lie at the heart of attempts to provide national systems of child support
enforcement. See mfira notes 260-77 and accompanying text.




Two developments mitigated the difficulties of the spouse who
remained m the original domicile. First, most states began to develop
grounds for divorce that made emigration to another state unnecessary.84
Second, states began to assert personal jurisdiction over former domicilia-
ries on the basis of specific activity within the forum. Unlike the general
jurisdiction asserted over a domiciliary,"5 this specific jurisdiction
depended on particular affiliating circumstances.86 The most common of
these arose when the former domiciliary had "maintained a marital
domicile" or lived within the state while mamed.8 7 As a New Jersey
court pointed out in Egbert v. Egbert,5 maintenance of a marital
domicile within the state has as many economic consequences as the
commercial activity on which jurisdiction is often based.s With the
adoption of long-arm statutes related to marital domicile, states in which
former spouses were left behind regained much of what had been lost
through the application of rules upholding the right to migratory divorce.
While the migrating spouse might get a divorce in a foreign forum, that
forum could neither relieve him of support obligations nor effect a
division of property that would bind the absent spouse. The state of
matrimomal domicile, in contrast, could exercise specifically affiliating
" See generally CLARK, supra note 16, at 405-12 (discussing development and adoption of no-
fault divorce in many states). California developed the first no-fault divorce law, see id., and
Kentucky followed approximately 12 years later, in 1972. See KY. R v. STAT. ANN. § 403.170
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
"General jurisdiction relies on an affiliation with a forum that makes it reasonable to assert
personal jurisdiction over a defendant in any cause of action even if the defendant is not served
within the forum. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-19 (1984)
(delineating current differences between general and specific jurisdiction). For a complete explanation
of the difference between general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction, see Arthur T. von Mehren &
Donald T. Trautman, Jursdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121,
1135-63 (1966).
" One commentator has said that former domicile is a specifically affiliating connection to a
state. See W NTRAuB, supra note 30, § 4.11, at 152 (citing among other cases Defazio v. Wright,
229 F. Supp. III (D.N.J. 1964) (relying on specifically affiliating circumstances of boat collision)
and Schneider v. Lmkfield, 209 N.W.2d 225 (Mich. 1973) (basing jurisdiction on "statute covering
actions arising out of 'ownership of personal property situated within the [forum]")).
"See, eg., ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 110, para. 2-209(a)(5) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) (allowing
jurisdiction based on maintenance of marital domicile or commission in state of an act giving rise
to cause of action); N.C. GEN. STAT. 1-75.4(12) (1967) (any action arising out of the maintenance
of a marital relationship in the state if the other party continues to reside in the state); N.Y. CIV.
PRAC. L. & R. 302(b) (McKinney 1974) (maintenance of marital domicile within state); see also
Linda D. Henry, Domestic Relations: The Role ofLong-arm Statutes, 10 WAsHBuN L.. 487 (1970);
Comment, Long-Anm Jurisdiction in Alimony and Custody Cases, 73 CoLUM. L. REv. 289 (1973).
See generally James 0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Long-Am Statutes: Obtaining Jurisdiction over
Nonresident Parent in Filiation or Support Proceedings, 76 A.L.R.3d 708 (1977).




jurisdiction under its long-ann statute. Unless its resident had consented
to an entry of appearance m a foreign divorce court," only the state of
matrnmomal domicile could render a binding adjudication on both
property and support.9'
By the end of the 1970s, state divorce jurisdiction schemes protected
two umportant state interests. First, by imposing significant residency
requirementsr9 a state could carry out its policy of granting divorces to
actual domicilianes, thereby maintaining the integrity of state divorce
decrees.' The longer an individual was required to remain in a state
before filing for divorce, the more certain the state could be of the
petitioner's candor in asserting his intention to remain in that state on a
permanent basis. Substantial residency requirements assured the divorce
forum state that it had not granted a divorce that could be rendered
invalid under the Williams II rule.' At the same time, long-arm statutes
protected the right of domcilianes to rely on their states' divorce rules.9
A long-arm statute focusing on the defendant's specific activity within the
forum enabled the forum domiciliary to achieve a complete resolution of
marital disputes with a spouse who had left the state of marital domi-
cile.96
B. Personal Jurisdiction and Child Support Obligations
The historical basis of the Williams-Vanderbilt rules provides an
important source of information for evaluating modem attempts to expand
personal jurisdiction, particularly in the context of child support. Like the
" Consent and appearance in a foreign divorce proceeding precludes a party from attacking the
divorce collaterally. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948). Those in privity with the consenting
party are similarly precluded. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
" See Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418-19 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 549
(1948); supra notes 56-69 and accompanying text.
,See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
"A state's interest in granting divorces only to actual domicilianes rested on its interest in
protecting forum judgments from collateral attack in a sister state. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
407 (1975).
See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
,See, e-g., statutes cited supra note 87.
"Residency requirements combined with long-arm statutes to create a window in which the state
of the former marital domicile was the only state that could resolve all issues related to the mamage
dissolution. Until the migratory spouse had satisfied the new forum s residency requirement, the stay-
behind spouse could file for divorce and seek resolution of all issues in the former marital domicile.
If the required period of residence in the ngratory spouse's new state was longer than any period
of separation demanded by the former domicile, the former domicile was the only state that could




intial ex parte divorce cases, child support cases are complicated because
states have adopted different rules related to standards of support and multiple
obligees, particularly second families.97 Interest analysis may help determine
those cases m which expanded jurisdiction affects important interests of the
states in which both support obligors and support recipients reside.
Constitutional requirements for the imposition of child support obligations
demand personal jurisdiction over both the recipient and the obligor. In Kulko
v. Superior Court,5 the Supreme Court held that California lacked personal
jurisdiction over a New York father whose former spouse sought to modify
support.99 The father's connections to the state of California were his
marriage to the children's mother m that state while he was on three-day leave
from the military and the presence of their children in the state."' The
Court held that none of the father's activity, whether it involved mere
acquiescence to the children's moves to California or actual assistance in
moving them, rose to the level of "purposeful[ly] availing" himself of the
laws of the state necessary to satisfy due process and thus to subject him to
Califorma's jurisdiction for purposes of child support modification.'
The mere presence of a child in a forum state has not necessarily been
a sufficient ground for that state to claim personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident obligor." Instead, states have looked at the obligor's specific
connections with the forum other than the child's presence there. Some states
have emphasized the torious nature of a parent's failure to provide support
for a child as a specifically affiliating connection to the forum in which the
child lives.' Failure to pay for a child's support harms the child located in
the state. In addition, the obligor may be seen as purposefully availing himself
of state benefits because the state often provides for the child when the
obligor does not. One problem with the tort theory is that an obligor may
have little or no control over the child's presence in the forum. Mere
acquiescence to the child's presence in the forum is not a purposeful
"See mfta notes 267-79 and accompanying text.
"436 U.S. 84 (1978).
" Id. at 96.
IC, Id. at 86-88. One of the Kulko children left the father's New York residence without Is
perrmssion; however, the father, who was the child's custodial parent at the time of her departure, did
not institute an action for her return. The father later assisted a second child in moving to California
to live with his mother.
"I Id. at 94.
102 Id.
.' See, eg., Lozmins v. Lozinski, 408 S.E.2d 310 (1991). But see In re Marnage of Kramer, 589
N.E.2d 951, 954 (IIl. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that tortious nonsupport within scope of statute does
not confer junsdiction without nummum contacts). At least one case has held that a parent's promise
to provide a child with a college education and his subsequent failure to do so caused an effect in
the state in which the child resided. Johnson v. Bradbury, 558 A.2d 61 (N.J. Super. 1989).
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availing."' As an alternative to the tort theory, some states have found
jurisdiction m concepts related to the execution of a contract within the
state.
105
An emerging theory uses the maintenance of a parent-child relationship
m the state to support the assertion of personal junsdiction over a nonresident
child support obligor.' 6 The concept is somewhat similar to other purpose-
ful availing arguments, although it is unlike the establishment of a marital
domicile because the location in which the availing occurs is less likely to be
the joint choice of the adults involved. Nevertheless, a parent who enters a
state for the purpose of maintaining a relationship with a child may take
advantage of that state's benefits. For example, a parent who visits with a
child in the child's state of residence relies on that state's rules to provide
access to the child, whether or not that state entered the order of visitation.
The parent benefits not merely from the recognition of the visitation order,
but from other state rules, such as those that give parents access to children's
school records or medical records.07
C. Kentucky's Prevous Rules Related to Long-Arm Jurisdiction
Kentucky's divorce jurisdiction scheme failed to mirror traditional rules
in two ways. Not only did the state's general long-arm statute lack specific
sections related to divorce, but another state statute ' impaired any clain
of personal jurisdiction over a former resident who was not personally served
within Kentucky or served pursuant to the long-arm statute.' 9 Although the
state had adequately protected its interest in granting divorces only to
domicilianes through the imposition of a 180-day residency requirement,"0
Kulko, 436 U.S. at 94.
For examples in winch consent to personal jurisdiction has been inferred from the execution
of a separation agreement providing for child support, see Massey v. Ball, 595 A.2d 390 (Del. Sup.
1991) (finding that husband who submitted separation agreement regarding child support obligations
for incorporation into divorce decree thereby consented to jurisdiction); Taylor v. Head, 594 A.2d
115 (Md. App. 1991) (stating that execution of separation agreement in North Carolina gave North
Carolina jurisdiction over nonresident father).
'" See Phillips v. Phillips, 826 S.W.2d 746, 748-49 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
.' Parents who enter a state in wnch they do not reside in order to visit children also run the risk
of being personally served within the state for purposes of child support modification. See Burnham
v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). When personal jurisdiction is based on the parent's physical
presence, no rimnmum contacts analysis is necessary. Cf. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 94.
" "No personal judgment shall be rendered against a defendant constructively summoned, and
who has not appeared in the action, except as provided in K.R.S. 454.210." Ky. ,Lrv. STAT. ANN.
§ 454.165 (MichieBobbs-Merrill 1985).
'" For an excellent discussion of Kentucky's long-arm scheme, see John R. Leathers, Rethinking
Jurisdiction and Notice in Kentucky, 71 Ky. L.J. 755 (1982-83).
"' KY. Rsv. SrAT. ANN. § 403.140(a) (Michne/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
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it failed to defend the interests of Kentucky spouses whose husbands or wives
departed the state before filing and service m a divorce action.
The absence of a comprehensive long-arm statute directed to marriage
dissolution never prevented petitioners who could satisfy the residency
requirement from seeking a divorce. If Alex, a former domiciliary of New
Mexico, moved to Kentucky and resided within the state for 180 days, he
might sue Barbara, his wife, for a divorce even though Barbara continued to
reside in New Mexico and had so little connection with the state of Kentucky
that she could not locate it on a map."' The absence of divorce-related
provisions in the general long-arm statute, when combined with Kentucky
Revised Statutes section 454.165,"' had an entirely different result. If Alex
and Barbara were lifelong Kentucky residents and a childless marred
couple,' Alex's departure from Kentucky and his acquisition of a new
domicile in New Mexico would have deprived a Kentucky court of any
jurisdiction to award maintenance to Barbara. Arguably, the absence of the
long-arm statute would also have deprived the Kentucky court of the right to
divide the couple's personalty.'
14
A party in Barbara's position might have argued that Kentucky could
assert personal jurisdiction over Alex if he owned real property in Kentucky.
The statute that provided support for this argument"5 would have been
effective to assist Barbara's claim for equitable distribution even if title to the
property were in Alex's name alone, as long as the property could be
classified as marital."' However, the statute would not have provided
.. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 316 (1942) (Jackson, J, dissenting) (complaining
that the Williams decision permitted a forum to grant a divorce in an instance in which it could not
hear a "suit to collect a grocery bill").
... See supra note 108.
"' If a nramed couple had children and the spouse remaining in Kentucky could prove that the
obligor absented himself or herself to avoid child support obligations, Kentucky courts would have
been able to claim long-arm jurisdiction. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 454.275 (Micbe/Bobbs-Merrill
1985).
.. But see Gaines v. Gaines, 566 S.W.2d 814, 819 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (finding authority for
disposition of personal property located within state).
"' Jurisdiction is based on
[h]aving an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this Commonwealth,
providing the claim arises from the interest in, use of, or possession of the real property,
provided, however, that such in personam jurisdiction shall not be imposed on a resident
who did not himself voluntarily institute the relationship, and did not knowingly perform,
or fail to perform, the act or acts upon which jurisdiction is predicated.
KY. REV. STAT. ANm. § 454.210(a)(6) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985).
.. Kentucky classifies marital property broadly: "All property acquired by either spouse after the
marriage and before a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital property, regardless of
whether title is held individually or by the spouses in some form of coownership "Id. § 403.190
(Micie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984 and Supp. 1992). Other states have recognized property ownership as
a factor in determining personal jurisdiction for divorce. See, eg., Williams v. Williams, 433 A.2d
1316, 1319 (N.H. 1981); Hann v. Harm, 421 A.2d 607, 609-10 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1980)
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personal jurisdiction over Alex if Barbara sought only a maintenance
award."' The statute' language limits its reach to matters arising from the
property itself as a specifically affiliating connection."' This limitation also
has a constitutional basis: in Shaffer v. Heitner,"9 the Umted States Su-
preme Court barred states from using the presence of property in the forum
to substitute for contacts with an absent respondent. As in the Kentucky
statute, property could serve as a basis for personal jurisdiction only if the
claim "arose from" the property.' The Court suggested that claims arise
from property only when they are directly related to the property's owner-
ship.'2' When this principle is applied in the context of divorce, claims arise
from real property only if one of the spouses has a legitimate ownership right.
However, the effect of this restriction is mitigated by Kentucky's definition
of marital property." If Alex and Barbara acquired a horse farm during
their marriage, even if title were in Alex's name alone, Barbara would have
an ownership clan at the time of divorce because the property was acquired
during the marriage. Ownerslup claims in divorce depend on the classification
of marital property rather than on title."as Barbara would have a right to
establish her ownership of a share of the property's value based on equitable
distribution rules.'"
(basing jurisdiction analysis in part on ownership of property in state). Despite the apparent
constitutional restraints imposed by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 213 (1977), property ownership
has been found to constitute sufficient basis for jurisdiction in divorce. Bechtold v. Bechtold, 588 So.
2d 321 (Fla. Dist. CL 1991) (finding wife's ownership of property in state sufficient for personal
jurisdiction).
"' In Kentucky, the award of a share of marital property may affect the grant or demal of
maintenance. Newman v. Newman, 597 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Ky. 1980) (finding criterion for establishing
amount of maintenance award is lack of narital property sufficient to provide for spouse's reasonable
needs). The award of maintenance is determined by balancing the needs of a claimant with the
obligor's ability to satisfy those needs. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.200 (Mchie/Bobbs-Merrill
1984). Although the Kentucky maintenance statute is drafted in terms of easing the transition from
marriage to single status, the award may be payable for longer penods of time in cases involving long-
term mamages. See Atwood v. Atwood, 643 S.W.2d 263 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982); Combs v. Combs, 622
S.W.2d 679 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Frost v. Frost, 581 S.W.2d 582 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
.' The claim must "anse[ ] from the interest in, use of, or possession of the real property." KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 454.210(aX6) (MichietBobbs-Merill 1985).
.' 433 U.S. 186, 213 (1977).
" Id. For a discussion of the difference between claims arising from property and other claims
related to. support, see John IL Leathers, Forum Jundicum: The First Two Years After Shaffer v.
Heitner, 40 LA. L. REv. 907, 913-17 (1980).
2' Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 208.
" All property acquired during the marriage is marital property. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.190
(Micue/Bobbs-Merrill 1984 and Supp. 1992); see supra note 116.
' See supra note 116 and accompanying text. The spouse claimng that property is nonmarital
bears the burden of establishing its nonmarital character. KY. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 403.190(3)
(MichielBobb's-Merrill 1984); see Bronson v. Brunson, 569 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978)
(preventing court from assigning property to spouse who failed to trace it to premarital assets).
" Barbara would be entitled to a 'Just and nght" division of marital property after consideration
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No similar long-arm statute covered disputes related to personal property.
In spite of a Kentucky decision indicating that the presence of personal
property within the state might permit its division," the Umted States
Supreme Court opinion in Shaffer v. Hetner2t prevents a state court that
grants an ex parte divorce'27 from awarding personal property on the basis
of its physical location m the state.'28 While the Shaffer Court noted
traditional exceptions related to status adjudications,'29 those exceptions
should not apply to property division or other mcidents of marriage.1
3
0
Kentucky also limited its ability to claim jurisdiction over nonresident
child support obligors. Courts had specific statutory authority to claim
personal jurisdiction over an obligor who maintained a marital domicile in
tis state and who left the state to avoid the payment of those obligations.''
Some other states found the abandonment theory sufficiently akin to tort
concepts that had long supported long-arm jurisdiction' and relied on that
notion to expand support for jurisdictional claims.'33 In contrast, the
of statutory factors such as each spouse's contribution to the acquisition of property, including the
contribution of a spouse as homemaker. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.190(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1984 and Supp. 1992).
12 Gaines v. Gaines, 566 S.W.2d 814, 818 (Ky. CL App. 1978).
433 U.S. 186 (1977).
,2? Most courts agree that Shaffer does not affect a forum's ability to grant an ex parte divorce.
See In re Mamage of Kimura, 471 N.W.2d 869, 875 (Iowa 1991); Carr v. Carr, 385 N.E.2d 1234,
1236 (N.Y. 1978); Carroll v. Carroll, 363 S.E.2d 872, 874 (N.C. CL App. 1988).
" Shaffer would disable a Kentucky court even when Kentucky was the former marital domicile.
While the absent respondent has sufficient munmum contacts with Kentucky to permit the assertion
of personal jurisdiction, Shaffer implicitly demands that the state claim jurisdiction over the person,
rather than substitute property's presence for that claim. See Leathers, supra note 120, at 914-16.
12 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 208 n.30.
Many Kentucky spouses whose husbands or wives have left the state have probably exercised
self-help equitable distribution by dividing joint bank accounts, since both parties have rights of
withdrawal. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.305 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984) (providing that
determination of beneficial ownership between joint account holders has no bearing on their ability
to withdraw funds). Self-help with regard to personal effects probably involves merely keeping what
is left behind by the absent spouse. However, some important personal effects, such as stock shares
or bank accounts held only in the name of one spouse, cannot be reached without a court order.
... Id. § 454.275 (Micle/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); see supra note 113.
"' Cf. supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text (noting attempts to find tortious conduct in
failing to provide child support).
"' See, e.g., Jones v. Chandler, 592 So. 2d 966, 971-73 (Miss. 1991) (finding that despite absence
of paternity provision from state's long-arm statute, act of begetting a child witlun the state provided
jurisdiction by sounding in tort); Hostetler v. Kennedy, 590 N.E.2d 793, 795 (Ohio CL App. 1990)
(holding failure to pay court-ordered child support a tortious act of omsmon); accord Lozinsla v.
Loznsla, 408 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1991). But see Duncan v. Duncan, 419 N.E.2d 700, 701 (Il1. App.
1981) (finding failure to pay child support does not in itself give personal jurisdiction under tort
section of long-arm statute); accord Morrill v. Tong, 453 N.E.2d 1221 (Mass. 1983); Moore v.
McFarland, 466 N.W.2d 309, 310 (Mich. App. 1990); Runnels v. Firestone, 746 S.W.2d 845 (Tex.
CL App. 1988) (failure to provide support for dependent adult child inadequate jurisdictional bass
under either tort or contract portion of Texas long-arm statute then in effect).
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Kentucky statute restricted the reach of the state courts by requiring a
Kentucky marital donucile.'"
If Kentucky parties were never mamed, the custodial parent was even
more likely to face significant problems in collecting child support from a
nonresident respondent. 35 Although the long-arm statute had a section
directly addressed to paternity, 36 that section only permitted Kentucky to
base paternity on the respondent's sexual activity within the state. In two
kinds of cases, that statute provided no grounds for the assertion of long-arm
jurisdiction. First, jurisdiction could not be claimed when the child had been
conceived outside Kentucky. Second, no jurisdiction existed when paternity
had been established but a support obligation was missing or inadequate
under Kentucky's rules.
II. PROVIDING FOR LONG-ARM JURISDICTION IN FAMILY LITIGATION:
KENTUCKY REVISED STATUTES SECTION 454.220
Kentucky Revised Statutes section 454.220 37 contains at least three
types of requirements: (1) those that establish the proceedings to which the
statute applies; (2) those that determine the parties covered by the statute; and
(3) those that specify the claims that must be made by the party attempting
to trigger the statute's use.138
The statute applies to both divorce actions and district court actions for
the establishment and enforcement of child support obligations outside
marriage.39 It clearly applies in divorce cases because of language related
" Jurisdiction was restricted to "a person whose marital domicile is in Kentucky." Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 454.275 (MiclueBobbs-Merrill 1985).
... See supra note 12 (availability of URESA provided a remedy that may have been less than
efficient).
'- See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.210(2)(a)(8) (Miclhe/Bobbs-Merrdll 1985 and Supp. 1992).
117 Personal jurisdiction of courts over nonresidents in certain domestic matters.-A court
in any matrimomal action or family court proceeding involving a demand for support,
alimony, maintenance, distributive awards, or special relief in matrimomal actions may
exercise personal jurisdiction over the respondent or defendant notwithstanding the fact
that he or she no longer is a resident or douciliary of this state, or over his or her
executor or adimmstrator, if the party seeking support is a resident of or domciled in this
state at the time the demand is made, if this state was the matnmomal domicile of the
parties before their separation; the defendant abandoned the plaintiff in this state; or the
claim for support, alimony, maintenance, distributive awards, or special relief in
matrimomal actions accrued under the laws of this state. The action shall be filed within
one (1) year of the date the respondent or defendant became a nonresident of, or moved
Ins domicile from, this state. Service of process may be made by personal service if the
defendant or respondent is found within the state or by service through the use of KRS
454.210(3).




to maintenance, distributive awards, or special relief in matrimonial actions,
and also because one of the statutory grounds for long-arm jurisdiction is the
former maintenance of marital domicile in the state.4 '
The statute's application to support claims for children whose parents
have never been married can be determined by a close reading of the types
of claims, as well as the types of proceedings, enumerated in the statutory
language. 4' The statute first states that it covers "proceeding[s] involving a
demand for support, alimony, maintenance, distributive awards, or special
relief m matrimonial actions"' At first glance, the phrase "in matrimonial
actions" might seem to modify all the claims listed, but later statutory
language indicates that this reading is incorrect. The statute covers two classes
of petitioners: parties seeking support who are residents or domiciled in
Kentucky at the tune the demand for support is made, and parties for whom
Kentucky was the marital domicile before separation."' 3 If the statute were
directed only to divorce, there would be no apparent need to specify both
classes of potential petitioners. Former marital domicile alone would permit
a Kentucky court to assert long-arm jurisdiction over any appropriate
nonresident spouse for the purpose of determining whether a Kentucky
resident petitioner had a right to post-dissolution support.' Since the statute
also covers demands for support of persons domiciled in Kentucky, it must
be intended to cover some support cases that are not related to divorce. The
covered cases necessarily involve child support because Kentucky law does
not provide support for unmarried domestic partners.' 45
The drafters of the statute lumped together two classes of defendants who
might be hailed into court under the statute: former residents and former
domicilianes. The two classes of defendants have a common characteris-
tic-absence from the state when litigation commences-but their former
connections to the state may differ. Domicile and residence are legally distinct
concepts.'" As every conflicts student knows, domicile is based on both
"'Id.
Id. A source of confusion may be the reference to family courts in the statute. There are
family court pilot projects in Lousville and Shelbyville. Perhaps the reference to family courts in the
statute envisions expansion of these pilot projects to other areas. The reference should not be taken
to mean that district courts may not use the long-arm statute. A district court has jurisdiction over
paternity actions and in that context operates as a family court. See id. § 407.170 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1984).
I,' Id. § 454.220 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992).
143 Id.
'" See id. (providing long-arm jurisdiction based on former maintenance of a marital dormcile
within the state).
' See Glidewell v. Glidewell, 790 S.W.2d 925 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990); Murphy v. Bowen, 756
S.W.2d 149 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
' See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text. While individuals have only one domicile, they
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physical presence and intention to remain for an indefinite period of time.147
Every person has a domicile, but he or she may not have more than one
domicile at a time."4 Domicile thus implies a unique and perhaps pervasive
connection with a state. In the case of most competent adults, that connection
is based on the choice of the person claiming the domicile. Residence is not
as well defined. Residence probably means more than a transient connection
with the state, but connotes a less stable connection than domicile.149 In
spite of the statute's equal treatment of the two terms, there may be some
important differences between former domicilianes and former residents.
The statute's classification scheme also contains requirements related to
the characteristics of both petitioners and respondents. The following table
may be helpful to characterize the parties covered by the statute:
Potential Parties Under Kentucky
Revised Statutes § 454.220'
Petitioner Respondents
Resident/domiciliary Former domiciliary Former resident
seeking support
Party whose marital Former domiciliary Questionable whether
domicile before separation applicable to former
was Kentucky resident
Party abandoned in Former domiciliary Former resident
Kentucky by defendant
Petitioner whose claim Former domiciliary Former resident
accrued under Kentucky
law
This table suggests the myriad combinations of petitioners and respondents
possble under the statute. For example, in the first column of the chart there
may have more than one residence. See, eg., Snelling v. Gardner, 590 N.E.2d 330, 333 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1990).
'i, See, eg., St. John v. St. John, 163 S.W.2d 820, 822-23 (Ky. 1942); McGowan v. McGowan,
663 S.W.2d 219, 222-23 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) oF CoNFLcr OF LAws § 11, at 47 (1969).
U9 See Snelling, 590 N.E.2d at 333.
' KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.220 (Miche/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); see supra note 137.
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are four possible types of claims: (1) a Kentucky resident seeking support
from a former domiciliary of Kentucky; (2) a domiciliary of Kentucky
seeking support against a former domiciliary of Kentucky; (3) a Kentucky
resident seeking support against a former resident; and (4) a Kentucky
domiciliary seeking support against a former resident.
The path through the statute is convoluted. Some of the statute's
applications, however, are clear and fall well within the range of constitution-
ally permissible state court activity. The statute does not lack significant,
legitimate application just because it is somewhat difficult to read. It rises
interesting questions that involve charting the boundaries between well-
established applications of the statute, less established but possibly permissible
applications, and those applications for which there is no current constitution-
ally permissible basis.
Ill. APPLYING MINIMUM CONTACTS ANALYSIS TO THE NEW STATUTE
A. Former Marital Domicile
The least troublesome portion of Kentucky's long-ann statute''
relates to the former maintenance of a marital domicile within Kentucky.
Prior maintenance of a marital domicile m a state is a widely accepted
basis for claiming personal jurisdiction over a nonresident respondent in
a divorce action.' 2 Maintenance of a marital domicile satisfies the
... KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.220 (Miclue/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); see supra note 137.
.52 See- g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.193(1)() (West Supp. 1989) (using marital domicile); IDAHO
CODE § 5-514(e) (1990) (maintaining a "marital dormcile at the time of the commission of any act
giving rise to a cause of action for divorce"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-209(a)(5) (Smith-Hurd
1992) (maintenance of a marital dormicile in state at time cause of action arose or when act
committed giving rise to cause of action); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308(b)(8) (1983) (living in marital
relationslup in state regardless of subsequent departure); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.3201(A)(6) (West
1991) (long-arm jurisdiction based on "nonsupport of a child, parent, or spouse or a former spouse
domiciled in this state to whom an obligation of support is owed and with whom the nonresident
formerly resided in this state"); MASs. ANN. LAWs ch. 223A, § 3(g) (Lawyers Co-op 1986) (state was
marital domicile for one year before action commenced and plaintiff's current residence); N.Y. CIv.
Pitc. L. & R 3-302(b) (McKinney Supp. 1993) (party seeking support is resident when demand
made and state was parties' matrimonial dormicile before separation); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(12)
(1992) (action ansing from marital relationship in state regardless of actor's departure if other party
still resides in state); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.3(7) (West 1990) (maintaining any
relationship to persons or property within the state, including support for minor children); TEx. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 3.26(i) (West 1993) (state may exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident spouse
if forum was last marital domicile and suit is brought within two years after marital residence ended);
Wis. STAT. Aim. § 801.05(11) (West Supp. 1992) (residing in state in marital relationship with
plaintiff for not less than six consecutive months within the six years preceding action); see also
Prybolsky v. Prybolsky, 430 A.2d 804, 807 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1981) (last marital doucile); Durand v.
Durand, 569 So. 2d 838 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (husband's move to Virginia did not deprive
Florida of personal jurisdiction over him when wife and children continued to reside in state); Arthur
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due process requirements of minimum contacts and purposeful avail-
ing.
153
The Kentucky long-arm provision" 4 does not define marital domicile.
Other courts have said that marital domicile is the last homeplace that the
parties shared.55 It is sometimes difficult to determine whether courts
exercising long-am jurisdiction are emphasizing the act of living as a married
person within a state or the respondent's connections as a former domiciliary
The emphasis may change in relation to specific statutory language. For
example, in In re Marrage of Brown,'5 a Kansas court ignored a military
husband's claim that he could not be subject to personal jurisdiction in a
Kansas divorce court because his retention of his Mississippi home of record
meant that he had never been a Kansas domiciliary. The Kansas long-arm
statute required only "living in a marital relationship within the state."'57 In
contrast, a Florida court in Lekovitz v. Lefkovitz 55 demed full faith and
credit to an Illinois divorce judgment because the Illinois statute required
marital domicile at the time the cause of action arose.'59 The court found
that the respondent husband had not been an Illinois domiciliary when the
divorce action was filed because he had already moved his domicile to
Florida."i°
Use of marital domicile language m Kentucky's long-ann statute raises
at least two issues. The first is whether both spouses must be Kentucky
domiciliaries in order to have a marital domicile within the state. Suppose, for
example, that both spouses live m Kentucky long enough to satisfy the state's
180-day residency requirement for divorce,' then one spouse leaves the
v. Arthur, 543 So. 2d 349, 351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (jurisdiction based on former marital
domicile not lost when husband moved to New York); Straus v. Straus, 393 S.E.2d 248, 250 (Ga.
1990) (rmnmum contacts of wife who moved from state included last marital domicile in state);
Mizner v. Mizner, 439 P.2d 679, 682 (Nev.) (jurisdiction found when husband's conduct during joint
residence in state gave rise to cause of action), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968); Dillon v. Dillon,
176 N.W.2d 362, 364 (Wis. 1970) (defendant husband had lived in state for at least six months
duing the preceding six years; jurisdiction existed if wife also satisfied statutory requirements). But
see CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 446-46(b) (West 1986) (requiring that both parties be dormcilianes
immediately prior to or at time when divorce action filed).
"4 See supra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
"4 KY. REv. STAT. A/NNi. § 454.220 (Micle/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992).
... See, eg., Lefkovitz v. Lefkovitz, 341 So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
'- 795 P.2d 375, 379-82 (Kan. 1990). Although living in a marital relationship within a state is
a constitutionally sufficient basis, marrying in a state is not. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S.
84, 86-87 (1978); Jenlns v. Jenkins, 556 So. 2d 441, 443 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
Brown, 795 P.2d at 380 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308(b)(8) (1983)).
i 341 So. 2d 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1976).
Id. at 254.
"4 Mr. Lefkovita's decision not to return to Illinois, the "act giving rise to Ms. Lefkovitz's divorce
action," came after his permanent move to Florida. Id.
.. KY. Rev. STAT. AN. § 403.140 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
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state. The remaining spouse wishes to sue for divorce and to have all
the parties' rights adjudicated in Kentucky As a petitioner, that
spouse may argue that her extended presence in the state establishes
Kentucky as her domicile and therefore as the parties' marital
domicile. The respondent spouse, however, might argue that although
he lived within the state for more than 180 days, he was not a
Kentucky domiciliary because he lacked the requisite intent.'62  In
this case, the petitioner's dilemma arises from the statutory language
itself rather than from constitutional constraints. Maintaining a marital
relationship in a state is a constitutionally sufficient basis for the
assertion of long-arm jurisdiction." It is the Kentucky statute that
requires marital domicile.'" As in other parts of the statute, domicile
should be judged by the acts of the parties as well as their expressed
intention.
Another issue is whether a party may claim a marital domicile in
Kentucky before satisfying the state's divorce residency
requirements.'65 Suppose, for example, that a few weeks after their
move to Kentucky, one of the spouses was again transferred to
another state. If that spouse's absence is not temporary'66 and the
12 To avoid this problem, a petitioner claiming marital domicile in the state should plead facts
other than the extended period of residence in the state. See Scoggns v. Scoggins, 555 A.2d 1314,
1323 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (requiring that pleading contain facts beyond bare assertion of domicile).
Since both parties' testimony may be self-serving, a court may need objective evidence of
dormciliary intent See McGowan v. McGowan, 663 S.W.2d 219, 222-23 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983)
(allowing personal jurisdiction where facts indicated Kentucky dorrcile although residency
requirement was not met).
... See In re Marriage of Brown, 795 P.2d 375, 381 (Kan. 1990).
6 See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 454.220 (MichielBobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992). Interpretation of any
long-arm statute requires a two-pronged test. First, the long-arm statute must provide a basis for the
claim of personal jurisdiction. Second, that basis must meet constitutional due process demands. See
Impola v. Impola, 464 N.W.2d 296, 299 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); In re S.A.V., 798 S.W.2d 293, 299
(Tex. Ct. App. 1990). The Kentucky petitioner's problem arises from the first step. The simplest way
out of the petitioner's dilemma is the use of an alternative statutory provision. Kentucky courts might
avoid the language related to marital domicile by emphasizing the defendant-onented requirements
of Kentucky Revised Statutes § 454.220: the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction if she is a
former resident regardless of her donciliary status. Another possible resolution would be to permit
the extended residence within the state to create a presumption of domicile to be rebutted by the
respondent spouse.
..' Domicile may be established in a period far shorter than the 180 days necessary to file for
divorce in Kentucky under Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.140 (MchietBobbs-Merrill 1984). An
individual who comes to Kentucky with an intent to remain for an indefinite period of time becomes
a Kentucky resident when he enters the state because dormcile requires only physical presence plus
that intent. RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNFLicr OF LAWS § 11 (1971).
'" Under existing Kentucky law, temporary absence would not destroy donciliary intent. See
McGowan v. McGowan, 663 S.W.2d 219, 222-23 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983); see also Powers v. Pansher,
409 S.E.2d 725 (N.C. App. 1991) (father's move to New Mexico did not destroy relationship between
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state to which she is transferred has a very short residency requirement,
it is probable that the departing spouse will be able to file for divorce m
her new state of residence before an action can be commenced by the
spouse remaining m Kentucky. To file for divorce, the Kentucky spouse
would be required to satisfy the residency requirements; they are not
abrogated by the long-arm statute. On the other hand, the long-arm statute
gives the Kentucky spouse one year after the departing spouse changes
his domicile or residence m which to file a support action,'67 so the
spouse remaining in Kentucky should be able to satisfy the residency
requirement and to file in one year.
A party claiming long-arm junsdiction over an absent respondent
must bring the action within one year from the date on which the
nonresident moves Ins or her domicile from the state.'"a Tins provision
limits the statutory language requrmng that the marital domicile have been
maintained in this state "before" the parties' separation.69 Nevertheless,
the statute does not insist that Kentucky must be the "last marital
domicile of the parties."'7 Cases may arise in which a party files for
divorce and claims long-arm junsdiction over an absent spouse after a
period dunng which both parties have been absent from the state. In those
cases, Kentucky courts should use a two-part procedure to determine the
extent of their junsdiction. First, the court should characterize the
petitioner's absence from the state. If she was a temporarily absent
domiciliary, she could file for divorce immediately upon her return.
However, if she changed her domicile, she would be required to fulfill the
180-day residency requirement before filing for divorce.' Second, if
the court determines that the petitioner remains a domiciliary, it should
mamage and North Carolina).
' KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.220 (Miclue/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992).
Id.
'"Courts in other states have imposed a reqirement that a marital donucile have been
maintained in the state within a reasonable period before the action was filed. See Popple v. Popple,
355 S.E.2d 657, 658 (Ga. 1987) (marital domicile maintained 20 years before action; no personal
jurisdiction); Marbumy v. Marbury, 352 S.E.2d 564, 565-66 (Ga. 1987) (husband who roamed in state
and resided there briefly with wife 14 years before divorce filed was not subject to personal
jurisdiction); Lieb v. Lieb, 385 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (marital domicile
maintained 13 years before action; no personal jurisdiction); cf. Fraix v. Cordie, 403 S.E.2d 793 (Ga.
1991) (two-year absence from state during wlch wife filed garnishment action did not preclude
personal jurisdiction).
" Cf Nickerson v. Nickerson, 542 P.2d 1131 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (requiring that state be most
recent marital doricile).
" See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.140 (MichietBobbs-Merrill 1984); Person v. Person, 563
N.E.2d 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (finding intent to remain indicative of changed domicile although
action commenced after one week's residence); McGowan v. McGowan, 663 S.W.2d 219, 222-23
(Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
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consider whether the now-absent respondent maintained a marital
domicile in the state within the required one-year period." If Kentucky
courts adopted this test, they would assume jurisdiction to decide all
matters related to divorce when Kentucky was the parties' last marital
domicile and the respondent spouse had not been absent from the
jurisdiction for more than one year, but they would not assert jurisdiction
m most cases if there were an intervening domicile.
This interpretation rests on consideration of the long-arm statute m
conjunction with the statutory residency requirement. To illustrate: if a
court finds that the petitioner spouse did not change domiciles, the court
may permit the petitioner to file for a divorce upon returning to the state
without actually satisfying the residency requirement." In that case,
Kentucky is the couple's last marital domicile even if the nonresident
spouse changed his domicile to another state. Moreover, Kentucky
Revised Statutes section 454.220 covers the respondent as a former
domiciliary. The respondent's absence for less than one year is not
sufficient to destroy the minmum contacts necessary to establish personal
jurisdiction. If the Kentucky court finds that the petitioner spouse m
fact changed domiciles and must therefore fulfill the residency require-
ment, ' the waiting period involved m the residency requirement is
likely to prevent Kentucky from serving as a forum without regard to the
issue of last marital domicile.'76 The 180-day residency requirement will
disable any spouse absent from the jurisdiction for more than six months
because she will not be able to establish residence before the one-year
7 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.220 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992).
i McGowan, 663 S.W.2d at 222-23.
" See Arthur v. Arthur, 543 So. 2d 349 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (allowing jurisdiction over
defendant who maintained home in state one year before action filed).
" KY. REV. STAT. AN. § 403.140 (MichietBobbs-Merrill 1984). For an example of such a
spouse, see Person, 563 N.E.2d 161.
" In considering all of the possible combinations under the statute, it is important to remember
that a respondent who does not move his domicile from Kentucky may be subject to the state's
general jurisdiction even though he is a nonresident. Millikin v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)
(holding domicile with n state gives that state sufficient bass for extraterritonal service). See Beasley
v. Beasley, 396 S.E.2d 222 (Ga. 1990), in which the Georgia court held that it had personal
jurisdiction over a husband residing in Saudi Arabia who obtained his first divorce in Georgia,
married the resident petitioner in that state, and resided there, when testimony established that the
defendant husband had always intended to return to Georgia. The first two factors cited by the
Beasley court are make-weights because the husband's intention to return meant that he was not
domiciled in Saudia Arabia, but in Georgia. If a petitioner relies on the dormciliary connection of a
nonresident spouse, the claim of personal jurisdiction is not based on service under the long-arm
statute. In consequence, Ky. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 454.165 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985), which forbids
personal judgment against a constructively summoned defendant, may limit this state's ability to
render a personal judgment against the nonresident defendant who cannot be served in the state.
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statutory limitation period runs.'" It is the residency requirement rather
than the long-arm statute that causes this outcome. Under this test there
may be a few cases m which Kentucky is not the parties' last marital
domicile but the petitioner spouse can meet the residency requirement. In
such cases the long-arm statute permits the state to assert personal
jurisdiction over the absent spouse.78 In Kentucky, such cases will
necessarily involve a petitioner spouse who changes domicile and then
returns to Kentucky with domiciliary intent within a period of six months.
In those cases, Kentucky courts may wish to consider other factors related
to the assertion of jurisdiction.' 79
B. Abandonment in the State of Kentucky
A separate clause of the new long-arm statute provides that a
respondent who abandons the petitioner m the state of Kentucky may be
subject to long-arm jurisdiction for the purpose of determining claims
related to property division, maintenance, or child support.' The
adoption of abandonment as a predicate for long-arm jurisdiction relies
heavily on the notion that committing a tort in a state is an acceptable
basis for long-arm jurisdiction.' Although long-arm jurisdiction based
on the commission of a single torthous act is so well accepted that it
hardly bears discussion, it does not necessarily follow that abandonment
of family members raises the same types of legal issues as having a
motor vehicle accident on Kentucky highways. While the abandonment
section of the statute meets both mmnmum contacts and purposeful
availing requirements," ' it may be difficult to apply.
In the first instance, it is far more simple to determine that Alex
drove his automobile on Kentucky highways than it is to determine that
Alex abandoned Barbara and their minor child Charles in Kentucky A
finding of abandonment may require that the court find both that the
abandoning spouse's activity caused the abandoned spouse's Kentucky
,n Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.220 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992).
m Courts in some other states have declined jurisdiction on the basis that the parties' last marital
domicile had a more significant relationshp to the mamage. See, e.g., Corcoran v. Corcoran, 353 So.
2d 805, 809 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978) (denying Alabama jurisdiction when patties had been domiciled
in North Carolina for four years).
'7' See Brislawn v. Brislawn, 443 So. 2d 32, 34 (Ala. 1983) (Alabama court asserted personal
jurisdiction over nonresident husband because Alabama was the only place in the United States where
the parties had resided as husband and wife), cert. dented, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
,' KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.220 (MchieBobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992).
See id. § 454.210(2)(aX3) (allowing personal jurisdiction where claim arises from "causing
tortious injury by an act or omission in this Commonwealth").
"' See supra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
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presence' and that the activity of the abandoning spouse was intention-
a.l" Several scenarios might raise interpretive problems on both issues. For
example, suppose that Alex and Barbara leave Kentucky and move to
Indiana. After they have resided m Indiana for ten months, Barbara returns
to Kentucky and sues Alex for child support. If Barbara's own choice
controlled the move to Kentucky, it might be difficult to argue that Alex
abandoned her in this state."5 Treating Barbara as a legally independent
person capable of choosing her own domicile" might mean that no act of
Alex's is an unequivocal cause of her presence m the state. An even narrower
view of causation might demand that a finding of abandonment be based on
Barbara's presence m the state prior to any act by Alex. In other words, Alex
could be found to have abandoned Barbara in Kentucky only if they were
both in Kentucky and he left the state to avoid the payment of child support
or other fanilial obligations. "  Causation might, of course, turn out to be
a more flexible concept. If Alex threw Barbara out of their Indiana home and
she returned to her Kentucky family, we might say that Alex "caused"
Barbara's Kentucky presence." But what of the case m which Alex moves
to Indiana to take a new job and Barbara, unhappy away from her family,
returns to Kentucky and sues Alex for child support on the ground that he
abandoned her here?"89
Tlus latter hypothetical illustrates not only the factual difficulty underly-
mg abandonment determinations, but also their close relationship to the
determination of fault. A court faced with Alex, who needs to leave the state
to find employment, and Barbara, who cannot be happy away from her close-
knit family, might be influenced by fault-related concepts in determining
" Causation, like donucile, may be a slippery factual issue. See Landis v. Kolsky, 409 A.2d 276,
280 (N.J. 1979) (finding that wife chose to move to California; husband not subject to personal
jurisdiction in that state).
'" See, eg., Hines v. Clendinmng, 465 P.2d 460, 463 (Olda. 1970) (court implied that husband
sent wife home to Oklahoma).
i See Landis, 409 A.2d at 280.
"' Even under traditional rules treating wives as derivative domcilianes whose choice was
dependent on their husband's intent, wives were permitted to chose their own domiciles at divorce.
See generally WENTRAuB, supra note 30, § 2.6.
1" Reading Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.220 (MichiefBobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992) in this manner
does not make the abandonment clause of the statute redundant in relation to Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 454.275 (Miche/Bobbs-Merrill 1985). The latter statute permits assertion of long-arm jurisdiction
only on the basis of the avoidance of child support obligations, whereas section 454.220's
abandonment clause gives rise to a similar claim with respect to spousal support.
' See Hines, 465 P.2d at 463.
'" See Meadows v. Meadows, 596 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (finding that wife
moved children to Ohio of her own volition). An important difference between the hypothetical case
and Meadows is that Richard Meadows had no prior contacts with Ohio. Alex, in contrast, must have
been either a Kentucky resident or a Kentucky dormciliary.
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whether Barbara was abandoned. If Alex is not providing any support for
Barbara and Charles, a court might skip the niceties of statutory
predicates and find that because the act of failing to provide support was
intentional, it could serve as the basis for a finding of abandonment. The
case is more difficult if Alex provides some support, but not as much as
Barbara would like. To determine that Alex has abandoned Barbara, the
court must find that Barbara's decision to stay seems more reasonable
than Alex's decision to go elsewhere in pursuit of lus career.
The abandonment section adds very little to the statute. If Alex and
Barbara are married, Barbara might claim long-arm jurisdiction over Alex
under the marital domicile section of the statute.'90 If they are not
married, she would qualify under the first section of the statute as a party
seeking support who is a resident of the state. The real importance of the
statutory section on abandonment may lie m its overbreadth. It may
provide a fallback when the presence of the support seeker in Kentucky
cannot justify jurisdiction over the absent spouse under existing constitu-
tional doctrine.
C. Claim Accruing Under Kentucky Law
The long-arm statute provides that a former domiciliary or resident
may be sued in a Kentucky forum if the petitioner's claim accrued under
Kentucky law.'9' This section, unlike the other three, does not re-
quire the petitioner to be a Kentucky resident or domiciliary The
respondent spouse's presence and acquisition of personal or real property
in the state would satisfy the constitutional minmum contacts and
purposeful availing requirements. 93 It is the respondent's activity of
acquisition in the state, however, not the property's presence here, that
counts." Similarly, when the petitioner's claim is for support, it is the
respondent's act of failing to provide support, not the debt itself, that is
the jurisdictional basis. '
" KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.220 (MieeBobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); see supra notes 44-52
and accompanying text.
... Personal jurisdiction is authorized if "the claim for support, alimony, maintenance, distributive
awards, or special relief in matrimomal actions accrued under the laws of this state.' Ky. R v. STAT.
Am. § 454.220 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992).
... See supra notes 151-90; mnfra notes 205-25 and accompanying text.
. Compare the "doing business" section of the general long-arm statute, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 454.210(2XaXi) (Miche/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992).
'4 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 213-17 (1977) (holding stockholders in Delaware




This statutory section may lead to an alteration of the rule of McCormick
v. McCormick9 that a former domiciliary may not be sued m Kentucky if
neither the respondent nor the petitioner has lived m the state for a period of
more than six months.97 A nonresident petitioner"'8 might sue a child
support obligor m Kentucky for child support obligations that accrued while
the obligor was a Kentucky domiciliary.99 or resident and could file at any
time within one year after the respondent changed his or her domicile or
residence to another state.a °
While the statutory section covering claims accruing under
Kentucky law may have this expansive effect in child support cases,
its application in other situations is more difficult to hypothesize.
Nevertheless, there may be some cases made possible by this section
that would otherwise not be subject to Kentucky jurisdiction. Some
parties may be able to claim jurisdiction under this portion of the
statute although Kentucky was never the marital domicile,20' they do
not reside in the state, and the respondent has left the state. Suppose,
for example, that Alex and Barbara separated in Ohio and Alex
moved to Kentucky 202 The parties lived apart for some time before
Alex left Kentucky Within one year after Alex left Kentucky, Barbara
procured an ex parte divorce in Ohio. She then sought to compel Alex
to litigate all remaining divorce issues by using the long-arm statute
and claiming that he had been a Kentucky domiciliary or resident
within the preceding year.0 3 Barbara's claim would rest on the
proposition that property Alex acquired while he lived in Kentucky
would have been marital property under this state's laws.2° Her
claim to those assets, therefore, accrued under Kentucky law and gave
rise to long-arm jurisdiction.
" 623 S.W.2d 909 (Ky. 1981) (analogizing thejunsdictional requirements for child custody, KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.420 (Miclie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984), to those for child support).
197 Id. at 910.
n For an argument that a long-ann statute requiring that the petitioner be a forum domiciliary
violates the privileges and immunities clause, see Westcott v. Westcott, 551 N.E.2d 1202, 1203
(Mass. 1990).
'" If the respondent is a Kentucky domiciliary, he may be sued in this state even if he is not
physically present. See Millilon v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940).
' KY. Ry. STAT. ANN. § 454.220 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); see supra notes 167-72
and accompanying text.
See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
: Since the parties never lived together in Kentucky, it could not be their marital domicile.
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 454.220 (Michle/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992).
In Kentucky, property acquired by either spouse's efforts during the mamage is marital
property. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.190(2), (3) (Miclue/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992). Physical
separation does not toll the acquisition of marital property. See Stallings v. Stallings, 606 S.W.2d
163, 164 (Ky. 1980).
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D. Party Seeking Support is a Kentucky Resident at the Time the
Demand for Support is Made
The most expansive section of the statute, and therefore the most
interesting, provides for long-arm jurisdiction when the party seeking
support is a Kentucky resident "at the time the demand [for support] is
made."2 5 This section raises both interpretive questions and significant
constitutional issues.
The statute speaks to "support" claims, but must have been intended
to apply primarily to child support. The statute requires that "the party
seeking support" be a Kentucky resident or domiciliary.2° The quoted
language is not defined within the statute. Child support claims may be
brought by the child's custodial parent, a custodian or guardian who is not
a parent, or the state m seeking reimbursement for Aid to Families with
Dependent Children ("AFDC") payments. 20 7 In each case, the parent or
custodian might be considered "the party seeking support" even though
the support is sought on the child's behalf. In most cases both the parent
or custodian and the child will be Kentucky residents, so there will be no
need to determine which of these parties is the required Kentucky
resident."' There may, however, be a few instances in which the parent
seeking support resides in Kentucky, but the child resides outside the
state. One possible example is the custodial parent who seeks support for
a child residing in an out-of-state institution or attending an out-of-state
school." Also, cases might arise m which the parent seeking support
is the nonresident, but the child is in a Kentucky institution. To cover
both cases, Kentucky courts would have to read the statutory language as
covering either the parent or the child.
The most appropriate use of tlus statutory section permits unmarried
parties to reach nonresident child support obligors through the use of
long-arm jurisdiction that parallels the jurisdiction provided by the marital
KY. REV. STAT. AN. § 454.220 (Miclue/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992).
The drafters attached no durational residency requirement to this aspect of the statute.
Moreover, since they provided that the party seeking support could be either a resident or a
domiciliary, courts may not be able to attach such a requirement outside the divorce context.
See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.211-.212 (MichieBobbs-Merrill 1984 and Supp. 1992)
(child support in the context of divorce); id. § 406.011 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984) (child support
in the context of paternity).
' The child's domicile would follow that of the custodial parent. See generally wEiNTRAuB,
supra note 30, at 13-14.
Kentucky law terminates a child's right to support at his or her eighteenth birthday unless the
child remains a high school student or is disabled. See generally GRAHAM & KELLER, supra note 4,
§ '123.03. Therefore, the child would not be eligible for support unless the school or institution had
been chosen because of the child's disability or the child was under 18.
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domicile section of the statute.210 Used in this way, the statute
applies to obligors who have clear minimum contacts and who have
purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of Kentucky For
example, if Alex and Barbara live in Kentucky and have a minor
child, Charles, Barbara may use Kentucky courts to sue Alex for child
support even if she brings her claim after he leaves the state, as long
as she does so within the statutory limitation period of one year. In
this instance, federal due process requirements would not be offended
by Barbara's suit because Alex might be found to have purposefully
availed himself of Kentucky's benefits.21' Although purposeful
availing may be less obvious here than in the case of marital
domicile, it nevertheless exists. Alex has maintained a parent-child
relationship in Kentucky That relationship gives rise to Alex's
purposeful claim of state benefits. Alex may, for example, have
claimed Charles as a tax dependent on a state income tax form. He
might also have claimed visitation rights" ' or other rights arising
from his relationship with Charles, whether or not the state sanctioned
his relationship with Barbara.213
In other instances the connection between the Alex, Barbara, and
Charles relationship and the forum may be less clear. Suppose, for
example, that Barbara was an Alabama domiciliary who met Alex, a
Kentucky domiciliary attending college in Alabama, at a social
gathering in Alabama.21 '4 Alex saw Barbara often in Alabama and,
after their relationship intensified, a child, Charles was born in
Alabama. Less than one year later, after Alex graduated from college
and moved permanently to Indiana (thereby changing his domicile),
2.. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
2 See supra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
2 See Phillips v. Horlander, 535 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Ky. 1975).
23 Compare Phillips v. Phillips, 826 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (father's contacts in
furtherance of parent-child relationship permitted assertion of personal jurisdiction over him) with
Dunlop v. Dunlop, 564 So. 2d 618, 619 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (occasional visits and payments
under URESA order did not support personal jurisdiction). The Phillips court noted that the
inconvemence to the respondent, who resided in Kenya, was not increased by Texas litigation because
travel from Kenya to Houston was easier than travel to the respondent's Mississippi domcile.
Moreover, the court said that the respondent admitted that he had expected the petitioner to move to
Houston when they separated. 826 S.W.2d at 720. But see In re Marriage of Nobisch, 6 Cal. Rptr.
2d 817, 821 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (where mother who registered Illinois decree in Texas sought to
enforce Texas modification against California father, court held that Texas did not have personal
jurisdiction over father); Miles v. Perroncel, 598 So. 2d 662, 670 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (Texas decree
claimrng personal jurisdiction did not accord due process to father whose only contacts with Texas
were occasonal visits with child).
234 A Kentucky student at an out-of-state college may retain Ins Kentucky dormcile. See Broaddus
v. Broaddus, 280 S.W.2d 144, 144 (Ky. 1955).
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Barbara moved to Kentucky and sued Alex for child support."' Barbara
meets the wording of the statute216 because at the tne that she filed the
support action she resided m Kentucky. In addition, Alex had been a
Kentucky domiciliary within one year from the date on which the sit
was brought. Unlike other applications of the long-arm statute, however,
its use with this set of facts does not rest on any act within the state of
Kentucky. All of the events leading to the establishment of the Alex-
Barbara-Charles relationship occurred in Alabama. If the long-arm statute
were the sole basis for asserting jurisdiction over Alex on these facts, it
might be difficult to show that Alex's relationship to Charles meets both
the requirement that a respondent have nmmum contacts with a state and
that the cause of action arise from those contacts.217 Alex's Kentucky
contact-his domicile within the state-has no necessary relationship to the
parent-child relationshlp established in Alabama. That domicile, however,
gives Kentucky general jurisdiction over Alex, who was subject to suit
m this state for actions that arose while he was a domiciliary, even
though he has now changed his domicile."'
Other factual circumstances may lead to a different result. If Alex
were an Alabama domiciliary attending college in Kentucky, he would be
"' Because child support is a continuing obligation, it may be difficult to compare Barbara's post-
conception move to Kentucky to other changes of domicile or residence by a petitioner after the event
giving rise to the cause of action. In some cases the United States Supreme Court has found those
changes insignificant because there was no evidence of forum shopping. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 319 (1981). In other cases, however, the application of a state's choice of
law after such a move has been found to violate full faith and credit principles. See John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1936).
"' Ky. REv. STAT. AN. § 454.220 (MichietBobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992).
"' See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 213 (1977).
' See supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92
(1917) (noting that summons left at last place of residence nught suffice to establish jurisdiction over
party who intended never to return). Another way to view the claim of personal jurisdiction over
Alex is to recognize that the necessary nexus between the Kentucky forum and Alex may be found
in reference to time rather than place. Thus, the issue is not where Alex and Barbara were located
when the conception and birth occurred, but what relationship Alex had to Kentucky when those
events transpired. Compare the traditional choice of law rule related to intestate distribution of
movables, which requires application of the law of the decedent's domicile at the time of death.
RESrATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CoNLi'crs § 314 (1971). For a case holding that domicile alone without
acts occurring in the forum might not give rise to jurisdiction, see Kroopf v. Guffey, 228 Cal. Rptr.
807, 811 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). See also Holden v. Holden, 542 A.2d 557, 560 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)
(finding allegations that ex-husband's second wife induced him to breach settlement agreement in
Texas were too tenuous to support Pennsylvania court's long-arm jurisdiction over her). One
commentator has said that mere "technical" domicile nught not be a sufficient connection on which
to base personal jurisdiction. See WmNTaRuB, supra note 30, § 2.15B. In Kentucky, the ability to
use the long-arm statute against a former domciliary avoids the problem of Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 454.165 (MichefBobbs-Merrill 1985), which bars the entry of a personal judgment against a
nonresident not personally served within the state.
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a Kentucky resident, whether or not he qualified as a domiciliary
Suppose that during that period Alex and Barbara conceived a child,
Charles, in Alabama.219 At the end of the school year, Alex left Ken-
tucky, having graduated from college, and moved to Indiana. During the
summer of that same year, Barbara moved to Kentucky In this case,
unlike the previous scenario, Alex is not subject to Kentucky's general
jurisdiction since he was a resident, but not a domiciliary."0 Jurisdiction
here can only be based on the long-arm statute and its specifically
affiliating connections, which include not only Barbara's current presence
m the state but Alex's former residence m the state.2 The necessary use
of the long-arm statute increases the importance of a nexus between the
former resident's connections to the state and the cause of action.' The
respondent's residence in Kentucky is not clearly connected to the parent-
child relationship if none of the acts associated with that relationship
occurred in Kentucky On the other hand, if some of those acts occurred
in Kentucky, the former resident is not m the same position as a party
whose only contact with a state was an occasional visit or phone call.'
Residence, however, covers a wide range of situations. In some cases
the former resident's sojourn in the state may have been temporary. Alex,
for example, might have been a transient worker in tobacco or the racing
23, If Alabama's paternity long-arm statute were similar to that in Kentucky, KY. Rnv. STAT. ANN.
§ 454.210(a)(8) (Miclue/Bobbs-Merrill 1992), Barbara could claim jurisdiction over Alex in Alabama.
' In some cases it may be difficult to tell whether Alex is a resident or a domiciliary. The fact
that Alex is not treated as a domiciliary for purposes of tuition at a state uiversity does not
necessarily mean that he would not be a domiciliary for purposes of child support enforcement. See
generally WEirAuB, supra note 30, § 2.8. If Alex has pervasive connections with the state, he may
be a former domiciliary under the statute. Id.
"' KY. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 454.220 (Micle/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); see supra table
accompanying note 150.
' See Impola v. Impola, 464 N.W.2d 296, 299 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (including source of cause
of action and its connection with state among factors deternimng jurisdiction); Kroopf v. Guffey, 228
Cal. Rptr. 807, 810-11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (discussing connection between activities and cause of
action). Other sections of the general long-arm statute contain their own "ansing from" limitations.
See, eg., Ky. RLrv. STAT. ANN. § 454.210(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992) (jurisdiction based
on paternity). The requirement is a constitutional one. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 213
(1977).
See Dunlop v. Dunlop, 564 So. 2d 618, 619 (Fla. App. 1990) (Florida resident's occasional
visits and child support payments to Georgia custodial parent did not provide adequate basis for
personal jurisdiction). One might argue that Alex is Charles's parent while Alex resides in Kentucky,
so Alex maintained a parent-child relationship there. Specifically affiliating jurisdiction normally
depends on activity in a forum, as illustrated by active verbs such as "engage" in business, "commit"
a tort, or "make" a contract. See Ky. Rnv. STAT. AN. § 454.210(b) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992).
If Kentucky courts interpret Kentucky Revised Statutes section 454.220 to require similar activity by
a former resident, they might supply the connection between the respondent, the forum, and the
litigation. Perhaps that activity could be failing to provide child support while a forum resident. It
is not entirely clear, however, that Kentucky would have a significant interest in protecting
nonresident children.
FAMILY OBLIGATIONS
industry rather than a full-time college student. If Alex spends four weeks
grooming Thoroughbreds at Keeneland, one might ask whether it is fair
to subject him to personal jurisdiction in this state if neither Barbara, the
custodial parent, nor Charles, the child, resided in this state at the same
time as Alex. The problem with claiming junsdiction over Alex is not his
lack of mimmum contacts with Kentucky, but whether those contacts are
sufficiently related to the litigation at hand. Thus, the new long-arm
statute's possible constitutional problems arise from its failure to mirror
the general long-arm statute in requirmg that the cause of action arise
from the respondent's contacts with the state'2
4
Kentucky's new long-arm statute' does not claim personal jurisdic-
tion over absent obligors solely on the basis of the child's presence in the
forum. Instead, the statute relies in every case on the respondent's former
connection to the forum. However, there may be cases m which the
statute's failure to require that the former resident's relationship to the
child have some Kentucky contact makes its application unconstitutional.
IV BEYOND MINIMUM CONTACTS: DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE
IMPACT OF THE CHILD'S PRESENCE IN TE FORUM
The Umted States Supreme Court decision in Burnham v. Superior
Court 6 not only upheld transient physical presence as the basis for
personal junsdiction, but also suggested that some assertions of personal
junsdiction need not be subjected to minimum contacts analysis."2
Some proposals for reforming child support enforcement, encouraged by
Burnham and motivated by the national need to provide adequate support
for children, have argued that a child's presence in the forum should be
sufficient grounds for assertion of personal jurisdiction over an obligor
owing support for that childe2 s Kentucky's new long-arm statute does
not yet take such an expansive position, but jurisdictional developments
may affect both court interpretation and legislative amendment of the
statute.
The faimess and efficacy of broad claims of personal jurisdiction
cannot be assessed adequately without considerng the relationship
' See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.210 (MicluelBobbs-Merrill 1985 & Supp. 1992).
Id. § 454.220 (MichiefBobbs-Merrill 1992).
n, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
2" Id. at 610, 621-22.
See Tentative Recommendations of the US. Commission on Interstate Child Support, 18 Farn.
L. Rep. (BNA) 2001, 2001 (Mar. 3, 1992) (recommending that Congress find that state where child




between jurisdictional claims, choice of law rules, and problems of the
enforcement of judgments. The fairness of a child support enforcement
system with broad grounds for asserting jurisdiction over nonresident
obligors may depend on whether the inconvemence to obligors can be
justified. If such a system has no choice of law rules to limit the forum's
ability to apply its own law, however, protective interests other than mere
inconvemence may be inplicated. Moreover, attention must be paid to the
enforceability of any judgment rendered under a system of expanded
jurisdiction. The enforcement of judgments advances both state and
national interests. Examination of state interests related to child support
may help define a system of expanded jurisdiction that operates both
fairly and effectively. In addition, state interests may reveal other
problems related to child support enforcement, and possible solutions.
For simplicity's sake, begin by considering two neighboring states and
their relationship to a support obligor, a support recipient, and their child.
If the parties in question are a mamed couple, the issue of child support
is likely to be mitiated m the context of divorce. Residency requirements
will generally assure that the state in which the divorce is initiated is the
domicile of at least one of the parties. 9 For our purposes we might
consider one state, Kentucky, as the state of origm because it is the state
in which the parties have their original contact with the court system. If
Kentucky grants the parties a divorce, awards child custody, and
establishes child support, it will probably do so without reference to a
jurisdictional rule that depends on the child's presence. Either both parties
will have consented to Kentucky as a forum, or the petitioner who has
chosen the forum will be able to use the marital domicile portion of the
new statute.20 The petitioner's ability to use long-arm jurisdiction
related to marital domicile will mean that the nonresident respondent had
fairly recent mnimum contacts with Kentucky.23 Those contacts suffice
to permit Kentucky to assert jurisdiction over the respondent; the child's
presence in the forum is jurisdictionally irrelevant.O2 For never-married
parties a similar result can be reached by reading the new statute as a
long-arm statute that treats residing in the state in the parent-child
relationship as similar to the marital domicile requirement2
33
Even if the respondent has left the state and is now a nonresident
living m another state, for example North Carolina, Kentucky should have
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.220 (Mchie/Bobbs-Menill Supp. 1992).
z" See supra notes 151-79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 151-79 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction not only to make the initial support award, but also to make
custody determinations and to modify child support under existing
jurisdictional rules.2 If the child and the custodial parent remain m
Kentucky, it will continue to be the child's home state for purposes of
custody determinations. Moreover, the traditional principles of continuing
jurisdiction with regard to child support are likely to give the state the
right to bring the obligor into court for modification purposes."35
The result is different if the obligor remains m Kentucky and the
child travels with the child support recipient to North Carolina. Under
current jurisdictional theories, an obligor not served while physically
present 3s m North Carolina is not subject to the jurisdiction of that
state's courts solely because her child lives there."3 The presence of her
child m that state is not a mminum contact that will satisfy the Due
Process Clause, even if the obligor consents to the child's presence m the
state and the state is an appropriate forum for the determination of
custody'because it is the child's home state.' Furthermore, if North
' The Kentucky forum is likely to be the child's home state for purposes of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.410(5) (Michne/Bobbs-Merrill 1984)
(Kentucky's encoding of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act). The Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988), makes decrees rendered by states with significant
connection jurisdiction enforceable and not subject to modification only if there was no home state
that could have exercised jurisdiction. See id. § 1738A(cX2)(B). If the child's home state enters a
custody decree and also claims continuing jurisdiction, no other state may modify the decree while
one party remains a resident of the rendering state. Id. § 1738A(d).
Once a forum establishes appropriate long-ann jurisdiction, it may use continuing jurisdiction
over the obligor to control support awards. Matter of Spence, 600 So. 2d 782, 783 (La. Ct. App.
1992); see also In re Marriage of Weishaupt, 514 N.E.2d 788, 791 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (extending
long-arm jurisdiction to proceedings incident to marriage dissolution).
' See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
' The use of the child's presence in the forum to establish a claim of personal jurisdiction over
the absent obligor might bejustified simplistically on the bass of the "status" exception to rummum
contacts. That label has sometimes been asserted as the rationale for forum ability to deterimne child
custody when the court lacks personal jurisdiction over one of the parties. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY
Ju usDicriON Acr § 12 cint., 9 U.L.A. 274 (1987) (noting that personal jurisdiction over both parents
is not necessary for child custody determinations). The same label has been used to explain ex parte
divorce. The status exception to the need for personal jurisdiction over an absent respondent is related
to the forum's compelling interest in applying its own law to provide the rule of decision. See supra
notes 69-77 and accompanying text. Ex parte divorce was justified by the forum's need to use
grounds it found acceptable so as to ensure the stability of marital status within its jurisdiction.
Likewise, a child's presence alone may give a state the right to deterrmne custody, but only in very
limited situations. In most cases the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act requires more than the
child's physical presence. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.420(1)(a)-(d) (Miclue/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
For example, the Act relies on the forum's status as the child's home state, requiring that the child
reside in the state with a party claiming custody for at least six months. See id. § 403.420(1)(a). In
Kentucky, a party cannot establish home state status by hiding a child in the state. See Freeman v.
Freeman, 547 S.W.2d 437, 441 (Ky. 1977). Emergency custody jurisdiction, however, may be
established by the child's presence in the state. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.420(I)(c).
" A forum that may deterrmne child custody is not necessarily empowered to determne child
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Carolina cannot assert jurisdiction, its child support guidelines cannot be
used to determine the standard for child support because a Kentucky court
will not use the North Carolina rules to set support. 39
Fair resolution of the jurisdiction issue involves two problems;
determining whether it is appropriate for North Carolina to serve as the
forum for establishing a child support order and determining whether the
North Carolina guidelines should control the support standard. The lack
of a choice of law function when child support is enforced through the
use of long-arm statutes and the widespread use of a system in which
jurisdiction determines choice of law24 should not preclude such an
assessment.
The normative value of jurisdictional rules based on the child's
presence within the forum can be assessed by determining the interest of
each state m serving as the forum and applying its own laws. By
examining the interests of both states, some policy matters may be
illuminated.
A state is most clearly interested in serving as a child support forum
when the use of its judicial system is economically efficient. To judge
that efficiency, assume first that the custodial parent remains with a child
in the former marital domicile or in the state where the noncustodial
parent formerly maintained a relationship with the minor child, in this
example Kentucky The child support obligor moves to another state,
North Carolina. If the child support guidelines in Kentucky were the same
as those in North Carolina and if the obligor had no dependents other
than the single child in question, the interests at stake would be limited
to the fairness of calling either party to litigate in a distant forum and the
interest of each state m serving as a forum. 24'
Each party has an interest in having his or her residence serve as the
forum in order to lower the personal cost of adjudication. However, the
states involved do not have identical interests in the costs of adjudication.
The costs of determining child support are absorbed by a forum state to
the extent that parties are not required by statute to bear the entire burden
of court costs.242 A state that serves as a forum for setting child support
support. See In re Marriage of Mobley, 569 N.E.2d 323, 324 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Hams v. Hams,
410 S.E.2d 527, 530-31 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991).
" See Hall v. Hall, 585 S.W.2d 384, 385 (Ky. 1979); Larsen v. Dunn, 474 N.W.2d 34, 39 (N.D.
1991).
See WEINTRAUB, supra note 30, § 4.2.
24 Removing differences between the two states' rules of decision eliminates the choice of law
problem, which clearly exists in the real world. In addition, removal of other dependents eliminates
state interests in residents other than the obligor.
"42 Although Kentucky law provides for the payment of costs, KY. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 403.220
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expends funds without a corresponding return unless its own residents
benefit from the establishment of the child support order. Thus, m this
scenario, North Carolina, in which no parties will benefit from the
establishment of a support order, should prefer that Kentucky serve as the
forum so that North Carolina can minimize its own costs.
Kentucky's interest in serving as a forum involves similar consider-
ations. Kentucky should be willing to bear the costs of setting the child
support award because the support ordered will inure to the benefit of a
forum resident, reducing the potential for dependence on the public. This
interest may be tempered by problems of enforcement: Kentucky might
be more reluctant to serve as the forum if its order were not entitled to
enforcement m North Carolina. Kentucky has no interest m setting its
decision-making process m motion if the decision will be ineffective. The
most efficient rule, therefore, would make Kentucky the forum for setting
the child support obligation, and would require North Carolina to respect
that obligation without modification.243
While current jurisdictional rules support the jurisdictional portion of
an efficiency-oriented solution, they do not resolve the question of
enforcement. Under current theory, a state m the position of Kentucky is
indeed a forum that may set the child support obligation, using a long-
arm statute similar to that adopted by Kentucky 2' North Carolina has
no personal jurisdiction over the obligee and cannot render a support
order that binds her. North Carolina, however, is not required to respect
the Kentucky order as to future child support obligations if the obligee
seeks to enforce it there. Child support orders are subject to modification
in a second forum to the same extent that they would be modifiable in
the rendering state.245 They are not entitled to full faith and credit
because they are not treated as final judgments.24
(Miclue/Bobbs-Merrill 1984), some expenses of operating the justice system are not covered by fees
assessed under this statute.
" Child support awards are modifiable prospectively in the state of enforcement. Many states
claim power to modify child support awards even in a URESA context. See In re Mamage of Aron,
274 Cal. Rptr. 357, 359 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (California court may entertain modification motion as
defense to enforcement); cf. Taylor v. Head, 594 A.2d 115 (Md. 1991) (finding mail service of wife's
motion for child custody and support provided constitutionally sufficient jurisdiction). In Kentucky,
however, responding courts do not have the power to modify child support obligations even at the
request of the recipient. See Commissioner ex rel Ball v. Muslak, 775 S.W.2d 524, 526 (Ky. Ct. App.
1989). See generally Jane H. Gorhar, Note, Stemming the Modification of Child Support Orders by
Responding Courts: A Proposal to Amend RURESA'S Antisupersesszon Clause, 24 U. MICH. J. L.
REF. 405 (1991). Orders modified in URESA proceedings do not affect a previously entered support
award. See In re Marriage of Casey, 556 N.E.2d 271 (II1. App. 1990).
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 454.220 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992).
See supra note 243.
24, See White v. Bennett, 553 S.W.2d 845 (Ky. 1977); Bradley v. Bradley, 214 S.W.2d 1001,
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If the parties' locations are reversed but all other factors are constant,
the state interests are the same. Suppose that the obligor remains in
Kentucky, while the obligee moves herself and the children to another
state, North Carolina. The same arguments that applied to North Carolina
in the previous situation now apply to Kentucky. Kentucky has no interest
m expending state funds to set child support because that expenditure will
not benefit state residents. Moreover, Kentucky has no interest in enabling
an obligor to avoid support payments. North Carolina, m contrast, has an
interest in establishing child support because it will benefit local parties.
Current jurisdictional rules do not permit North Carolina to serve as the
forum on these facts.247 If the sole connection between the obligor and
North Carolina is the child's presence in the state, North Carolina cannot
exercise personal jurisdiction over the obligor, even though it has stronger
interests than Kentucky.
If both states would set identical obligations, the obligor's interest in
avoiding the forum in which he does not reside relates only to the
mconvemence of defending in a distant forum. Without differences in
state child support laws, the obligor's state would have no stake in his
private interest in litigating at home. Long-arm statutes that base personal
jurisdiction on the nonresident's maintenance ofa parent-child relationship
in the state address this problem, although indirectly 2. If an obligor
comes to a state to maintain a relationship with his child, it is less likely
that the child's state will be a truly inconvenient forum. Thus, while the
child's presence in the forum is not alone a sufficient contact for personal
jurisdiction over the obligor, the maintenance of the parent-child
relationship in the state may constitute a sufficient contact. Applying this
rule would produce an efficient solution, but only if Kentucky were
forced to respect any North Carolina decree.
These examples show that where no state protective policies are at
work and the only issue is the respondent's convemence, the state in
which the obligee resides is the only interested state and the issue of
which state should serve as a forum might be labeled a false conflict.249
If the conditions met in this example reflected all legitimate state
I001 (Ky. 1948).
247 Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93 (1978); see supra notes 98-102 and accompanying
text.
24 See, e.g., Phillips v. Phillips, 826 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (finding father's visits
in furtherance of parent-child relationship provided constitutionally sufficient basis for jurisdiction).
The proposed Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, § 201 (Draft 1992) [hereinafter "UIFSA"]
requires that the obligor actually reside in the state with the child rather than merely visit a resident
child.
"' See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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interests, there would be no reason not to permit the assertion of personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident obligor based on the child's presence in
a state. States do have protective policies, however. Child support
guidelines express not only an interest in protecting the child involved but
an interest, in the obligor, particularly when the rule affects other minor
dependents of the obligor. Thus, most situations may not involve the false
conflict hypothesized when only an obligor's convemence interest was
affected.
Strong conflicts between state interests are often related to differences
among standards of child support imposed in various states. All states
have child support guidelines," ° but those guidelines vary in important
ways. Some important differences relate to self-support reserves for the
child support obligoras the choice of gross or net income as the basis
for calculating the support owed, 2 the age at whuch child support may
be ternumnated,ss and the treatment of multiple families related to the
same obligor. In actions under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act ("URESA"), 5 the responding court must use the law
of the state in which the obligor resided or was present during the period
for which enforcement is sought.O' In contrast, neither agencies" nor
courts applying child support guideliness receive any choice of law
directive. Thus, either tribunal is likely to apply its own law, especially
when child support is set in the divorce context.
1* The Family Support Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 662-67 (1988), not only requires such
guidelines, § 666(a), but demands that they create a rebuttable presumption that the amount of
support owed is the amount provided by the guidelines. Id. at § 667(b)(2). Courts deviating from the
guideline are required to provide reasons for the deviation in writing. Id.
1 See; eg., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 240(1-b)(6) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
m See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.212 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992) (using gross
income).
"I In Kentucky, child support terminates at the age of 18 unless the child is a high school
student. See id. § 403.213(3). In contrast, other states provide support beyond age 18. See, eg.,
Napolitano v. Napolitano, 732 P.2d 245, 246 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (Colorado provides for support
until age 21). A forum state will nonmally employ the age of majority under forum law. See Early
v. Early, 484 N.W.2d 125, 128 (S.D. 1992) (applying South Dakota's age of majority over mother's
claim that court should use age of majority in Colorado, where child resided), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 272 (1992).
"' See Rebecca B. Garland, Note, Second Children, Second Best? Equal Protection For
Successive Families Under State Child Support Guidelines, 18 HAsTINGs CON. LQ. 881 (1991).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 407.010-.480 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
", See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 407.150 (Miclue/Bobbs-Merrill 1984). The URESA choice of law
rule may have constitutional dimensions. The United States Supreme Court has said that a foirm
whose only connection to the litigation is the presence of the plaintiff in the forum may not apply
its law as the rule of decision. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930).
. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 405.405-.991 (Michle/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992) (providing for
adrmistrative enforcement of child support).
m See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
1992-93]
KENTUCKY LAW JOuRNAL
Differences m the child support rules are important to the obligor if
expanded jurisdictional statutes permit the assertion of personal junsdic-
tion over him m a forum whose rules demand a higher standard of
support than that of Ins residential forum. In that case the risk of
expanded jurisdiction to the obligor involves more than the mconvemence
of defending in a different forum. Moreover, to the extent that the higher
standard of support m the forum where the child resides deprives the
obligor's other dependents of support, it may touch on an important
interest of the state in which the other dependents reside. When child
support standards differ among states, each state will have a strong
interest m the application of its own law, either to protect the child or to
protect the obligor.
Long-arm statutes that claim jurisdiction over an obligor based on prior
contacts help a state to implement its protective policies. Suppose that Alex
and Barbara reside in Colorado, a state that sets the age of emancipation for
child support purposes at twenty-one asa If Alex leaves Colorado and moves
to Kentucky, which uses an emancipation age of eighteen,2 jurisdictional
rules should deprive him of the advantage of Kentucky local law.261 If
Colorado has a long-arm statute similar to that of Kentucky, Barbara may sue
Alex for child support m Colorado, and the local age of majority will apply
Problems arise only if Kentucky protects Alex by applying its local law to
hum.262 As a general rule, Kentucky public policy exceptions will not
prevent the enforcement of the Colorado judgment as long as Kentucky finds
Colorado's exercise of jurisdiction to be consistent with due process.
63
Fairness dictates that neither Alex nor the state to which he has
repaired should be able to deprive Barbara of child support that she
might reasonably have expected to receive under the laws of the last
marital domicile or the last location of the parent-child relationship.2"
° See Napolitano v. Napolitano, 732 P.2d 245, 246 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).
See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.213(3) (MichielBobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992).
21 But see Tucker v. Hill, 763 S.W.2d 144, 144 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (applying Kentucky age of
majority in child support action related to Indiana divorce decree). For an argument that Tucker was
wrongly decided, see GRAiAM & KELLER, supra note 4, § T23.03 at 68 (Supp. 1991). Even under
URESA Alex would lose the local law advantage if there were an outstanding Colorado support order
for his child. If Kentucky modified the Colorado support order using its age of majority, that second
URESA order would not supersede the first order. See In re Marriage of Casey, 556 N.E.2d 271, 272
(Ill. CL App. 1990) (holding judgment in URESA action does not alter obligations under original
divorce judgment).
Tucker, 763 S.W.2d at 145 (decided under URESA).
" Since Kentucky does not modify URESA orders as a responding state, it should not modify
child support orders in this context. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
, See People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 311 P.2d 480, 482 (Cal. 1957) (party expectations
should affect choice of law).
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The situation is different if Alex and Barbara begin their relationship
as Kentucky residents. If Barbara takes the minor child to Colorado,
personal service on Alex in that state would subject hun to the jurisdic-
tion of Colorado courts.26 In addition, Colorado might use expansive
rules of personal jurisdiction, claiming that the child's presence alone or
combined with Alex's visits or telephone calls were minmum contacts
sufficient for long-arm jurisdiction.2 While proposals for changes in
child support enforcement do not go so far as to make the presence of the
child in Colorado the basis for junsdiction,2 7 they may achieve the
same result by permitting the application of forum law and by guarantee-
ing enforcement to that judgment.
Under the proposed Uniform Interstate Family Support Act
("UIFSA"), the law of a state issuing a child support order supplies the
rule of decision.2" Moreover, if Colorado were the child's home state,
the Act requires other states to defer to the Colorado forum and grants
continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over modification of child support
to that forum in many cases.269 Thus, if Colorado issued the first order
for child support, it could require the provision of support until age
twenty-one, and enforcement of that order would be required in Kentucky
if both states had adopted the Act.2 °
This result is accomplished through a combination of expanded
jurisdiction and requirements for the enforcement ofjudgments consistent
with the Act. The expanded jurisdictional bases include residing in the
state with a child, residing in the state and providing prenatal expenses
or support for the child, and a catch-all that allows a court to claim
jurisdiction on 4ny basis consistent with state and federal constitutional
requirements.27' If more than one child support proceeding is filed, the
Act contains specific provisions for determining which state should
resolve the dispute, giving preference to the child's home state.272
Finally, a state that issues a child support order consistent with the Act
US See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990) (holding that state courts have
jurisdiction over nonresidents physically present in state).
' See Phillips v. Phillips, 826 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); supra notes 106, 213, 248
and accompanying text.
2S See Uniform Interstate Family Support Act § 201(3)-(5) (Draft 1992) (basing jurisdiction on
child's residence only if nonresident obligor lived with, supported, or caused the child to reside in
that state).
.. Id. § 604(a).
, Id. §§ 204(b), 205 (providing continuing exclusive jurisdiction unless all parties and child
reside elsewhere).
I d. § 207(a)(3).
Id. §§ 201(3), (4), (8).
27 Id. § 204 cmi. If there is no home state, a first-to-file rule controls.
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retains continuing exclusive jurisdiction over modification... The Act's
choice of law provision reinforces the prohibition against modification by
specifying that the law of the issuing state governs the standard of
support.
274
Unlike URESA, which uses the law of the obligor's state to set the
standard for child support enforcement, 5 UIFSA will use the law of the
child's home state to determine the standard of support. The URESA rule
has been criticized as unfair to support obligees who were deserted by
obligors fleeing to safe havens with lower support standards.276 Similar
unfairness may arise if expansive long-arm statutes permit claims of
personal jurisdiction over obligors who have little connection with the
forum other than the child's presence m the state. Just as Alex should not
be able to lower the standard of child support by moving to a less
generous state, Barbara should not be able to improve the standard by
moving to a more generous state.
2 7
The UIFSA rule does not eliminate the conflict between state interests
when states have different child support standards, but its requirements
for enforcement may eventually lead to higher standards for child support
in all states. If states with lower standards are required to demand that
local obligors pay higher child support for children who do not reside m
the state, it may become easier for state legislatures to insist that the same
level of support be provided to local children.
Multiple families give rise to one of the most difficult policy choices
faced by states implementing child support guidelines.27 In Kentucky,
child support guidelines permit an obligor to deduct from gross income
the amount of prior court-ordered child support if the obligor is current
on the ordered obligation.279 Thus, once an order is entered against an
obligor, subsequent claimants take from an income reduced by the
27 Id. § 205.
" Id. § 604.
See KY. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 407.150 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
"' See WEINTRAUB, supra note 30, § 5.214 at 256.
"4The are several problems with attempting to provide fairness to both parties with a choice
of law rule. First, not even the United States Supreme Court has federalized choice of law rules other
than in cases involving fraternal insurance societies. See Order of United Commercal Travelers of
Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 589 (1947) (Full Faith and Credit Clause demanded that court apply
law of state of association's incorporation). Second, a rle giving priority to the state with the most
significant interest in the parties' relationship might be easy to apply in the case of previously married
parties, but very difficult in the case of a more limited relationship or a chance encounter. Where,
for example, is the state with the most significant relationship to parties who conceived a child at the
site of the 1993 Super Bowl and went on to live in different states? Of course, choice of law would
not be a problem if there were a national standard for child support.
"4 See Garland, supra note 254.
"4 KY. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 403.212 (Miclue/Bobbs-Merrill 1992).
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amount of prior orders. The Kentucky rule may reflect a policy that "first
families come first.""28 Other states, however, have indicated that all
biological children of the same obligor should share equally m his or her
disposable income sl If Alex and Barbara are living as a married couple
domiciled m Kentucky before Alex's departure for North Carolina,
Kentucky may now exercise personal jurisdiction over Alex.2 In
setting Alex's child support obligation, Kentucky will apply its own rule
related to multiple families.2"3 Assuming that there is no other order for
child support, Alex's full gross income will be subject to the child support
guidelines even if North Carolina, the state in which he now resides,
would take account of his subsequent children. Alex and Barbara's
situation may create a true conflict if Alex has a second family m North
Carolina. Kentucky's clain to jurisdiction over Alex does not eliminate
North Carolina's protective interest in Alex's second family
The proposed Uniform Interstate Family Support Act addresses these
problems through rules related to enforcement rather than jurisdiction.
Under the proposed Act, North Carolina would be required to treat the
Kentucky order for Alex's first family in the same manner as a local
order.2 If North Carolina generally treats all children of the same
obligor equally, it may apply that rule to the Kentucky child support
order. If Barbara moves to a state that treats all children equally, while
Alex remains m a "first families first" state, she continues to enjoy the
benefit of the first family rule since orders requiring support must be
enforced in Alex's state. Alex's subsequent family receives no protection
' Treating this option as a "first families first" rule may reflect a rmddle-class bias. A "first
families first" rule expresses a world view in which family obligations arise from legal relationships
that are entered into sequentially. In such a system a first family will have the first child support
order because no subsequent marriage or children will ensue until after a divorce terrmnates the first
marital relationship. When parent-child relationships do not arise from a marriage, however, the first
child support order need not reflect birth order for children. In that context, a rule that takes account
of prior court orders is not necessarily a "first children first" rule at all. For example, an obligor who
has a child born while he is mramed to someone other than that child's mother may find that the first
child support order entered refers to the later-born child. Discrminating against the later-born child
on the basis of illegitimacy would violate equal protection constraints. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 672 (1977) (holding that statute denying opportunity for heirs born out of wedlock to prove
paternity violates Equal Protection Clause). It is not clear, however, that subjecting all later-born
children to a priority rule that preferred earlier children would violate equal protection. Cf. Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970) (holding Maryland ceiling on AFDC payments constitutional
despite providing proportionately less aid for children in large families).
" See Beasley v. Beasley, 245 S.E.2d 820, 822 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 251 S.E.2d 433
(N.C. 1979).
-1 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 454.220 (Miclue!Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); see supra notes 151-79
and accompanying text.
' Ky. RLV. STAT. Ai. § 403.212 (Mchie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992).
', See Uniform Interstate Family Support Act § 208 (Draft 1992).
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because they live in a state whose local law does not afford them that
protection. Thus, the Act permits a state to apply local law when its
purpose and focus relates to dependents of the obligor rather than to
the obligor as an individual.
Setting fair child support obligations requires attention to the standard for
child support, the appropriate reach of state jurisdiction, and the ability to
modify orders once they have been entered. Recent proposals for change will
affect two of those areas-expanded jurisdiction and modification of orders.
The Umform Interstate Family Support Act is directed primarily to problems
of enforcement. Under that Act, once a child support order is entered, the
issuing tribunal retains continuing and exclusive jurisdiction to modify the
support order as long as the child or one of the parents lives m the state.285
Like the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980,86 the new uniform
act proposes to create a system m which only one state is empowered to issue
enforceable orders.2 Expanding jurisdictional rules will only increase the
importance of this control. It remains to be seen whether uniform federal
child support standards could eliminate other conflicts.
CONCLUSION
Any expansion of jurisdictional rules that fails to take account of
differences in state child support laws may have a significant effect
on the ability of child support obligors to maintain a parent-child
relationship, particularly when the custodial parent moves to a state
whose law would impose greater obligations than the law of the state
in which the parties formerly resided.
Each state, including Kentucky, is likely to exercise its long-ann
jurisdiction to the fullest extent possible so as to command support for its
own residents. The state benefits by shifling the burden of providing that
support elsewhere. The long-arm jurisdiction inconveniences the obligor,
but tlus may not be unduly unfair if he or she retains a connection to the
forum state by maintaining the parent-child relationship there.s Where
no parent-child relationship exists within the state, however, the Kentucky
long-arm statute may go too far in relying on the respondent's former
domicile or residence and the petitioner's current presence in the state.
289
'I Id. § 205.
2" 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988).
UIFSA "aims, so far as possible, to allow only one support order to be effective at any one
time." UIFSA, prefatory note at 4 (Draft 1992).
v See supra notes 106, 213, 248, 266 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 151-79 and accompanying text.
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Kentucky's new long-arm statute provides welcome relief from tis
state's inability to exercise personal jurisdiction in a number of instances
that would have fallen within accepted constitutional parameters. The
Kentucky General Assembly should consider the continued viability of
Kentucky Revised Statutes section 454.165, at least with respect to
child support obligors, because that statute bars the assertion of general
jurisdiction over a nonresident domiciliary who cannot be personally
served within the state."'
The adoption of the new long-arm statute will not cure problems
related to modification of child support obligations by other states. Thus,
Kentucky courts might wish to consider whether the existence of personal
jurisdiction alone should always result in the use of the Kentucky child
support guidelines. The legislature must also pay close attention to the
proposed Umform Interstate Family Support Act, 2 which suggests the
future of child support enforcement for the entire country.
-' KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.165 (Micue/Bobbs-Merrill 1985).
291 Id.
" See supra notes 275-84 and accompanying text.
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